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Summary  findings
Chile is currently evaluating a wide range of possible  NAFTA offers enough access to benefit Chile;
trade policies. Using a global computable general  MERCOSUR does not,  once the trade diversion costs of
equilibrium model, Harrison,  Rutherford,  and Tarr  MERCOSUR are taken into account.
examine a range of trade policy and complementary tax  *  Under their preferred-elasticity scenario, Chile can
policy options for Chile.  convert the MERCOSUR agreement from a loss to a gain
They focus on Chile's principal preferential trade  if it lowers its external tariff to between 6 and 8 percent.
policy options:  a free-trade area with MERCOSUR, a  Doing so will also increase the gains from a potential
customs union with MERCOSUR, and a free trade area  agreement with NAFTA.
with NAFTA. They also examine such options as  *  Chile's current  value-added tax imposes
complementary tariff reduction with nonpartner  distortionary  costs because collection rates are not
countries in combination with implementing the free  uniform. Chile will gain if it can collect the VAT more
trade area options; unilateral or global trade  uniformly.
liberalization; and the optimum unilateral tariff.  *  Tariff reductions from trade reform will require an
Their principal policy conclusions:  increase in domestic taxes, so greater uniformity in
* Lowering Chile's tariffs preferentially or  domestic taxes (less distortion in replacement taxes) will
multilaterally leads to only small gains as Chile starts  maximize the benefits from trade reform. Welfare will be
with a rather efficient external trade regime, uniform  improved by moving toward uniformity in the VAT and
tariffs of 11 percent.  lowering the Chilean tariff to between 6 and 8 percent.
* Largely because of its efficient uniform tariff,  This model ignores dynamic gains from trade
preferential tariff reduction will reduce Chilean welfare  liberalization, the result of importing either a greater
through trade diversion, unless Chile can improve its  variety of products  or more technologically advanced
access in the markets of partner countries.  products.
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AppendicesSummary of principal policy conclusions:
1.  Since  Chile  starts  with a rather  efficient  external  trade regime  of 11%  uniform  tariffs,
our results show  that lowering  its tariffs  preferentially  or multilaterally  leads  to only small
gains.
2.  Preferential  tariff  reduction  will reduce  Chilean  welfare  due to trade diversion  unless
significantly  improved  access  can  be obtained  in the markets  of partner countries.  We show
this is due in large part to the efficient  uniform  tariff that Chile  starts with.
3.  We  find that the NAFTA option offers sufficient access to benefit Chile, but
MERCOSUR  does not.  That is, the trade diversion  costs of MERCOSUR  dominate the
welfare effects for  Chile even when improved access to MERCOSUR markets is
incorporated.
4.  In our preferred elasticity  scenario,  Chile can convert  the MERCOSUR  agreement
from a loss to a gain if it lowers  its external  tariff to between  6 and 8 percent.  Lowering  the
external tariff to between 6 and 8 percent will also increase the gains from a potential
agreement  with NAFTA.
5.  The existing Value Added Tax in Chile imposes distortionary  costs due to non-
uniform  collection  rates. Moving  toward  collecting  the Value  Added  Tax at a uniform  rate
will reduce distortions  and provide  substantial  benefits.
6.  Since  tariff reductions  from trade reform  will require  an increase  in domestic  taxes,
greater uniformity in the domestic tax structure (that is, less distortion costs from
replacement  taxes)  will increase  the benefits  of trade  reform. If combined  with a movement
toward  uniformity  of the VAT, unilateral  and multilateral  lowering  of the Chilean  tariff to
between  6 and 8 percent  will increase  Chilean  welfare  in our  preferred  central  elasticity  case.
7.  Our model ignores  dynamic  gains from trade liberalization,  which could arise from
importing either  technologically  advanced  products  or a greater  variety of products.  Then
either  multilateral trade  liberalization or  preferential arrangements with  a  large
technologically  advanced  region  could lead  to much larger gains  than we have estimated.Foreword
As regional trading arrangements (RTAs) have spread, enlarged and deepened over the last
decade, they have posed challenges to economists on both intellectual and policy levels. On the
former, do RTAs stimulate growth and investment, facilitate technology transfer, shift comparative
advantage towards high value-added activities, provide credibility to reform programs, or induce
political stability and cooperation? Or do they, on the other hand, divert trade in inefficient
directions and undermine the multilateral trading system?
The answer is probably "all of these things, in different proportions according to the
particular circumstances of each RTA."  This then poses the policy challenge of how best to
manage RTAs in order to get the best balance of benefits and costs. For example, should technical
standards be harmonized and, if so, how; do direct or indirect taxes need to be equalized; how
should RTAs manage their international  trade policies in an outward-looking fashion?
Addressing these issues is one important focus of the research program of the International
Trade Division of the World Bank. It has produced a number of methodological innovations in the
traditional area of trade effects of RTAs and tackled four new areas of research: the dynamics of
regionalism (e.g., convergence, growth, investment, industrial location and migration), deep
integration (standards, tax harmonization), regionalism and the rest of the world (including its
effects on the multilateral trading system), and certain political economy dimensions of regionalism
(e.g., credibility and the use of RTAs as tools of diplomacy).
In addition to thematic work, the program includes a number of studies of specific regional
arrangements, conducted in collaboration with the Regional Vice Presidencies of the Bank.  Several
EU-Mediterranean Association Agreements have been studied and a joint program with the staff of
the Latin American and Caribbean Region entitled "Making  the Most of Mercosur" is under way.
Future work is planned pn African and Asian regional integration schemes.
Regionalism and Development findings have been and will, in future, be released in a
number of outlets. Recent World Bank Policy Research Working Papers concerning these issues
include:
Glenn Harrison, Tom Rutherford and David Tarr, "Economic Implications for Turkey
of a Customs Union with the European Union," (WPS 1599, May 1996).
Maurice Schiff, "Small is Beautiful, Preferential Trade Agreements and the Impact of
Country Size, Market Share, Efficiency and Trade Policy," (WPS 1668, October 1996).
L. Alan Winters, "Regionalism versus Multilateralism,"  (WPS 1687, November 1996).
Magnus Blomstrom and Ari Kokko, "How Foreign Investment Affects Host Countries"
(WPS1745, March 1997)Eric Bond, "Using Tariff Indices to Evaluate Preferential Trading Arrangements: An
Application to Chile" (WPS  1751, April 1997)
Magnus Blomstr6m and Ari Kokko, "Regional Integration and Foreign Direct
Investment: A Conceptual Framework and Three Cases" (WPS1750, April 1997)
Planned future issues in this series include:
Pier Carlo Padoan, "Technology Accumulation and Diffusion: Is There a Regional
Dimension?"
Sherry Stephenson, "Standards, Conformity Assessments and Developing Countries"
Maurice Schiff and L. Alan Winters, "Regional Integration as Diplomacy"
Anthony Venables and Diego Puga, "Trading Arrangements and Industrial
Development" (forthcoming)
Other papers on regionalism produced by IECIT include:
Ahmed Galal and Bernard Hoekman (eds), Regional Partners in Global Markets: Limits
and Possibilities of the Euro-Med Initiative. CEPR 1997.
Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "Imports of Inputs, Foreign Investment and
Reorientation of East European Trade," World Bank Economic Review (forthcoming)
Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "The EU's Mediterranean Free Trade Initiative,"
World Economy
Bernard Hoekman and Simeon Djankov, "Effective Protection in Jordan and Egypt in the
Transition to Free Trade with Europe," World Development.
Bartlomiej Kaminski, "Establishing Economic Foundations for a Viable State of Bosnia and
Hercegovina: Issues and Policies".
In addition, Making the Most of Mercosur issued the following papers:
Alexander J. Yeats, "Does Mercosur's Trade Performance Raise Concerns About the
Effects of Regional Trade Arrangements?" (WPS1729, February 1997))
Azita Amjadi and L. Alan Winters, "Transport Costs and 'Natural' Integration in
Mercosur" (WPS1742, March 1997)Claudio Frischtak, Danny M. Leipziger and John F. Normand, "Industrial Policy in
Mercosur: Issues and Lessons"
Sam Laird (WTO), "Mercosur Trade Policy: Towards Greater Integration"
Margaret Miller and Jerry Caprio, "Empirical Evidence on the Role of Credit for SME
Exports in Mercosur"
Malcom Rowat, "Competition Policy within Mercosur"
For copies of these papers or information about these programs contact Maurice Schiff, The
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20433.
An additional major outlet for World Bank-sponsored  research on regionalism will be the
Annual Bank Conference on Development in Latin America, 1997, Montevideo, June 30-July 2,
1997, organized by the Office of the Chief Economist and the Technical Department for Latin
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1. Introduction  and Summary of Results
Chile is currently evaluating a wide range of possible trade policies.  We employ a global
computable general equilibrium model to quantitatively examine a broad range of trade policy and
complementary  tax policy  options  for Chile. We begin with  and  focus on  Chile's  principal
preferential trade policy options: (1) a free trade area with MERCOSUR'; (2) a customs union with
MERCOSUR; and (3) a free trade area with NAFTA. We also evaluate other trade policy options
for Chile, including an evaluation of complementary tariff reduction with non-partner countries in
*We  would like  to acknowledge  the helpful  comments  of: Jerry Haar of the North-South Center;
Maurice Schiff,  Alberto Valdes and L. Alan Winters of the World Bank; Dominique Hachette, Juan
Coeymans  and other seminar  participants  at Pontifica  Universidad  Catolica de Chile; Eugenia  Muchnik
and Hector  Assael  of the U.N. Economic  Commission  for Latin  America  in Santiago;  Maria  Wagner  of the
Chilean Ministry  of Finance;  M. Marcel  of the Chilean  Treasury;  Klaus  Schmidt-Hebbel,  Ricardo  Vicufia
and seminar participants at the Central Bank of Chile; and Liselott ICana  of the Chilean Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. We thank Isidro Soloaga,  Ulrich Reincke and Minerva  Patefia for excellent  research,
translation  and logistical  support. We are grateful to the North-South Center for research  support. The
views  expressed  are those of the authors not necessarily  those of the World Bank or any of its Executive
Directors,  the North-South Center, any agency  of the government  of Chile or those acknowledged.
'MERCOSUR is a customs union between Argentina,  Brazil, Paraguay  and Uruguay. In a free
trade area Chile and the partner area eliminate  tariffs  and export  taxes  or subsidies  against  each other, but
retain separate tariffs against third countries. In a customs union Chile and the partner region  adopt a
common  extemal  tariff. The free  trade area between  Chile and MERCOSUR  has been agreed;  a customs
union with MERCOSUR  is a possibility,  although  remote. Recent  events  in Mexico  and domestic  political
considerations in  the United States have stalled negotiations for Chile's membership of NAFTA.
Nonetheless, many commentators  believe  that this option is still viable in the medium run. Again,  the
proposal is for Chile to join NAFTA  as a free  trade area and to retain its tariffs  on third countries.
- 1-combination  with  implementation  of  the  free  trade  area  options;  unilateral  or  global  trade
liberalization; and the optimum unilateral tariff. In all cases, we examine the role of domestic taxes
to compensate for the revenue loss, and show how the choice of these taxes is important to effective
implementation  of the trade policies. Our welfare and tax implication results are summarized in
Table 1.
Several features of the Chilean economy drive our results. Contrary to many other countries
implementing preferential trade agreements, Chile starts with a relatively liberal external trade
regime since it has a low uniform tariff of 11%.  That is, Chile's external trade regime generates few
distortions compared with many other countries. Thus, although marginal improvements can be
achieved, Chile can do little to greatly improve the efficiency  of its resource allocation while relying
simply on further reduction of its tariffs. 2
Despite Chile's small share in export markets, it may have a small amount of monopoly
power in export markets. From Lemer symmetry effects, Chile's uniform import tariff is equivalent
to an export tax, and thus can serve the role of exploiting any market power on exports Chile may
possess. With central elasticities that market power will be very small, and hence the optimal
Chilean export tariff will be very small (about 3-4 percent in our model with central elasticities).
However,  with low elasticities the optimal export tariff to exploit market power will be higher
(about 14 percent). 3 Since Chile starts with an 11 percent uniform tariff, reductions at the margin
from this tariff will increase welfare in our central elasticity scenario but reduce welfare in our low
2This  condusion ignores  dynamic  gains  from trade liberalization,  which could  lead to much larger
gains.
3For  all regions  the elasticity  of substitution  in demand between imports from different countries
is 30 with central  elasticities  and 8 with low  elasticities.  This is the key parameter  determining  the extent
of Chilean monopoly  power in our model.
-2  -elasticity scenario.  Since we believe that Chile has little monopoly power on world markets, we
prefer to focus on the central elasticity scenarios  in Table 1. We present a full set of results for lower
elasticities,  however,  since there  are some who believe that trade  elasticities are  lower, and
presentation of the different elasticity dependent estimates provides insight into the relationship
between terms-of-trade effects and elasticities. In addition, we also present some results from an
alternate high elasticity model formulation in which Chile has virtually no monopoly power.
We systematically evaluate the interaction between domestic taxes and trade policy.  Our
results indicate that the gains can be considerably increased if trade policy reform is accompanied
by domestic tax reform, and that the gains from domestic tax reform are substantial in their own
right. Thus, in Table 1 the trade policy options are evaluated under a variety of replacement tax
options. That is, the trade policy options will result in a reduction in government revenues, but we
impose the constraint in our model that lost government revenues are replaced by the VAT. In an
appendix Isidro Soloaga provides an updated estimate of the collected VAT rates by sector in Chile.
Although the legal rate of VAT is 18% for all sectors, collection of the existing VAT is non-uniform
and it thus imposes distortion costs. Use of the existing VAT therefore limits the scope for welfare
increasing tariff reduction, either multilaterally or preferentially. We show that Chile can reduce its
legal VAT rates to about 50% of present levels and improve its welfare by 0.3% of its GDP if it were
able  to  eliminate  evasion and  collect the VAT uniformly. 4 These  gains  are substantial  and
comparable to the best trade policy options. Moreover, the beneficial trade policy options generate
considerably more gains if a uniform VAT is achieved.
41n addition, we eliminate  the output tax, which applies primarily  to energy  and beverages  and
tobacco.
-3  -Now consider our estimates in Table 1 beginning with the preferential trade arrangements.
With central elasticities, either the free trade area or a customs union with MERCOSUR will be
significantly welfare reducing for Chile (welfare losses would be between 0.4 and 0.9 percent of
Chilean GDP per year) and would require large compensating increases in the VAT (rows 1 and 2
of Table 1). If demand elasticities are low, there is much less trade diversion, and these arrangements
can be marginally welfare improving, but the welfare effect is close to zero. These calculations take
into account the value to Chile of improved terms-of-trade  (access) in the markets of MERCOSUR.
In section 2 we provide a detailed, graphical explanation of the welfare economics of preferential
trade arrangements to provide further intuition for these results.
On the other hand, we estimate that the free trade area with NAFTA will increase Chilean
welfare under virtually all of our elasticity and replacement tax scenarios.  The main reason for the
gains in the case of NAFTA is the value to Chile of improved access to the NAFTA market. If Chile
were  to preferentially lower its tariffs to zero against all NAFTA countries without receiving
improved access to the NAFTA market, Chile would lose significantly from NAFTA. In fact, even
if lack of improved access were limited to only one sector in our model, non-grain crops, Chile
would lose from NAFTA. This result provides a concrete example of the point emphasized by
Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981] regarding the importance of improved access in preferential
trading areas.  Thus, we find welfare gains from any of the preferential trade arrangement under
active consideration only if it obtains significantly improved access, and only NAFTA provides
sufficient access.
We also  show that the fact that Chile starts with a uniform tariff partly explains its lack of
benefits from preferential tariff reduction.  The preferential trading arrangement introduces some
-4  -non-uniformity into the otherwise uniform Chilean trade regime, which typically reduces the benefits
in our model.
We have examined the impact of lowering the tariff to 6% and also implementing the
preferential trade arrangements (rows 5 and 6 of Table 1). Reducing tariffs to 6% will reduce the
trade diversion costs and improve welfare to that extent. Comparing row 5 with row 1 and row 6
with row 3, we see that with our preferred central elasticities  welfare is significantly improved. With
low elasticities, however, there is an adverse terms-of-trade effect that mitigates the welfare gains
from reduced costs of trade diversion.
In rows 7, 8 and 9 we show the welfare effects to Chile of multilateral trade liberalization.
With our central elasticities and use of a distortionless domestic tax replacement, Chile will gain
from reducing  the tariff to 6 %. In column 3 we see there are additional marginal gains from
reducing the external tariff from 8 % to 6%. In column 1, however, one can see that if the existing
VAT is employed, however, the marginal multilateral reduction in tariffs from 8% to 6% reduces
welfare, since the domestic tax distortions limit the scope for trade policy.  However, even with a
distortionless tax, a reduction to zero is immiserizing due to adverse terms-of-trade effects with our
central elasticities. Of course, higher elasticities would yield lower optimal tariffs.
Our quantitative model of the Chilean economy also explicitly includes the economies of
Argentina,  Brazil, Mexico, the United States, Canada, the European Union  and several other
countries or regions that Chile trades with. Since the results of preferential trade arrangements are
ambiguous in general, the objective of using a CGE model is to determine the relative impact of
various effects and to quantitatively assess what are the most important policy reforms available for
Chile.
5-'The model which we use is an extended and updated version of a model which we developed
recently to study the effects of the Uruguay Round. The model specification has been documented
in detail in Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1995] [1995a] [forthcoming]. The model is updated with
a new data base that reflects more recent information on production structures and trade policies in
most of the countries included. It has also been extended to include several new countries, most
notably to include an explicit representation of Chile. It allows us to
incorporate the "market access" effects of partner country tariff reductions on Chile, as well as the
traditional effects of tariff reform in Chile itself.
In Section 2 we provide a graphical description of the welfare economics of preferential trade
agreements which should facilitate greater intuition into our results. In Section 3 we briefly describe
the model.  In Section 4 we describe the policy results obtained with this model,  and explain
intuitively what is driving these results.
2.  The Welfare Economics of Preferential Trade Agreements
A graphical exposition of the welfare economics of preferential trade arrangements, which
is  based  on  a similar presentation in  Bhagwati and Panagariya  [1996], will help explain  the
numerical results we obtain in the next section.  Apart from the partial equilibrium nature of the
diagram, it represents accurately the type of model structure we employ.  To be consistent with the
data that shows both imports and exports of the same product group at a fairly disaggregated level,
we  assume  in  Figure  1 that  goods  are  differentiated by  country  of  origin  (the Armington
assumption). The home country's  demand for a representative good from the partner country is
-6  -measured to the right of the origin and its demand for the similar, but not identical,  good from the
rest of the world is measured to the left of the origin. We choose units so that the world price of both
the partner good and the good from the rest of the world is unity in the initial equilibrium.  We
assume that the preferential trade area is not yet implemented in the initial equilibrium, so that the
ad valorem tariff rate t applies to imports from both sources.
Consider a small preferential  reduction in the tariff on partner country imports to t'.  This
results in an increase in the quantity demanded for partner country imports to P'. Since imports from
the rest of the world are gross substitutes  with partner country imports, there is a downward shift in
demand for imports from the rest of the world to M'R In the new equilibrium the quantity demanded
of imports from the rest of the world declines to R'.
The welfare calculation proceeds in the standard manner. In the market for partner country
imports, consumer surplus increases by the area B + A. The net change in tariff revenue is Tp - B,
yielding a "trade creation" area of A + Tp in the market for partner country imports. In the market
for imports from the rest of the world, there is a loss of "surplus" equal to the lost tariff revenue (the
"trade diversion" effect), which is the area TR. Following the principles developed by Harberger
[1971], this  is a loss in welfare to the home country, 5 and we ignore the market for the home
5The  justification  for the welfare  analysis  of Figure  1 is equation  8 (or its special  case,  equation 5)
in Harberger [1971]. He considers the case  where there is a change in the tax on good 1 (in our case
lowering the tariff against partner country imports) in the presence of taxes on other goods in the
economy,  say goods  2, ..., n. In our case,  the most notable other  tax is the tariff  on competing  imports  from
the rest of the world in the same sector.  Then the change  in welfare  is the change  in surplus on good 1,
plus the change in surplus  on goods  2 through n, where the latter is equal to the tax in the other sectors
times the change in quantity in those sectors,  summed over all such sectors.  To simplify Figure 1, and
because  the cross-substitution  effect in demand will be smaller  and of either sign in the other sectors,  we
have ignored  sectors  outside of the directly  competing  import sector.  Our quantitative analysis,  which is
general  equilibrium  and based on the Hicksian  equivalent  variation,  incorporates  the welfare  changes  from
all goods.
-7  -country's  good, since there is no difference between price and marginal cost in the market for the
home country's product.  Thus, the net change in welfare is equal to A + Tp  - TR.
Is there a net gain or loss to the home country from this change? The answer depends on the
relative size of the two shaded areas in Figure 1. For a very small change in the initial tariff rate
toward the partner country, these areas are approximated by rectangles whose height is the initial
tariff rate. Then there is a net gain or loss to the home country if and only if the base of the rectangle
Tp  is larger than the base of the rectangle TR,  which occurs if the increase in imports from the partner
country exceeds the decline in imports from the rest of the world.  With a decline in the price of
imports from the partner country, aggregate imports  have become relatively cheap compared to home
country  production.  Since imports will also  typically be  gross  substitutes for  home country
production, consumers will increase their demand for aggregate  imports at the expenses of domestic
production. Then there will be an increase in the total demand for imports due to a substitution away
from domestic production, and an increase in exports to satisfy the trade balance condition. Thus,
for a small preferential reduction in the tariff, there must be an increase in the net welfare of the
home country.
Now consider progressive preferential reduction of the tariff on the partner country. For each
successive reduction of the tariff on the partner country, the height of the trade creation area declines
but the height of the trade diversion rectangle for imports from the rest of the world does not. At
some point, before the tariff on partner country imports goes to zero, further preferential  tariff
reduction will reduce welfare.
Summarizing, some small preferential  tariff reduction is beneficial, but eventually it becomes
harmful. Thus, in general we do not know from economic theory if trade creation or trade diversion
- 8 -dominates the welfare economics of complete tariff elimination against partner country imports. The
actual outcome will depend on economic variables specific to the country such as elasticities, tariffs
and shares. We can, however, use Figure 1 to derive a number of insights on how the parameters
affect the results.
First, if the tariff on imports from the rest of the world is lowered, the rectangle of  trade
diversion will be smaller.  In the limit, the home country can eliminate trade diversion completely
by going to free trade on imports from the rest of the world. This has important policy implications
for a country participating in a free trade area, since it can always lower its tariff on imports from
the rest of the world sufficiently to generate gains from the Free trade area. We show below that if
Chile were to lower its tariff on the rest of the world to 6%, it will increase the gains (or reduce the
losses) of any free trade agreement in which it would participate. One disadvantage of a customs
union over a free trade area is that Chile gives up its ability to reduce its tariffs on the rest of the
world.
A second insight from Figure 1 is that if products from the partner country and the rest of the
world are very good substitutes  the trade diversion rectangle will be relatively large. That is. if the
cross elasticity of demand between partner country imports and rest of the world imports is larger
(a,,, in our model), the rectangle of trade diversion will be larger. Intuitively, when partner country
products can replace imports from the rest of the world easily there will be greater displacement of
partner country imports and greater tariff loss. It is for this reason that our estimates of the gains
from regional trade arrangements decrease as we increase the assumed trade elasticities.
Finally, if home country products and imports are good substitutes (,DM  in our model), it is
more likely that preferential trade arrangements  will be beneficial. That is, if home country products
-9-and imports are good substitutes then the demand curves in Figure 1 will be relatively flat and the
area A + Tp  will be larger. Intuitively, if imports from the partner country can substitute easily for
home country products, the amount of trade creation will be greater following a reduction of tariffs
to the partner country.
One important element that is missing from Figure 1 is the value to the home country of
improved access to the markets of the partner country. An agreement which would be immiserizing
without improved access could improve welfare when improved access is taken into account. We
show below that this in fact occurs with respect to the welfare impact of Chile joining NAFTA. This
point has been stressed by Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981], who argue that many analyses of the
effects of a customs union or free trade area ignore the benefits of improved market access. The
policy implications of this omission are quite simple: if market access is ignored or assumed to be
negligible, then there is nothing that a small open economy such as Chile can achieve from signing
preferential trade agreements that it cannot achieve by unilateral policy actions. 6
3. A Multi-Regional  Trade Model
A. General Features of our Model
The quantitative model developed to evaluate the trade policy options facing Chile is multi-
regional and multi-sectoral. Table 2 lists the 11 regions included explicitly in the model, as well as
the 24 sectors included in each region. The general specification of this model follows our earlier
6This conclusion needs to be qualified,  since we assume constant returns to scale and perfect
competition  in our model.  Models  with imperfect  competition  which yield additional benefits from more
or  better  varieties of imports could  introduce gains from preferential trade arrangements if  the
arrangement is with a technologically  advanced  region.
- 10  -multi-regional model of the effects of the Uruguay Round. The most important differences are the
inclusion of data for Chile, updated tariff rates for Argentina and Brazil, as well as more recent data
for all other regions.
Why adopt a model that includes so many regions, when our interest is in evaluating the
effects on Chile of the proposed reforms? The answer is that the proposed reforms entail changes
in trade policies for Chile and trading partners of Chile. In the case of membership of MERCOSUR,
for example, we need to consider the effects on Chile of a reduction in Chile's import tariffs on other
MERCOSUR  members. We also need to account for the "market access" effects on Chile of a
reduction  of import tariffs by MERCOSUR or NAFTA members on Chile's exports to them.
Although we could account for these changes exogenously  by changing the terms-of-trade of Chile
in a somewhat ad hoc manner in a small open economy model, these impacts are best assessed
endogenously.
Although the general theory of the effects of preferential trading arrangements does allow
for these changes in partner country tariffs on the home country, 7 some empirical approaches to
evaluating these effects ignore them.' As mentioned above, this important policy issue has been
stressed by Wonnacott and Wonnacott [1981]. Our framework allows us to explicitly evaluate the
importance to Chile of improved market access to MERCOSUR and NAFTA.
The sectoral detail in our model gives a rich picture of the economic structure of Chile's
7  See Wooton [1986), and Harrison, Rutherford  and Wooton [1989] [1993].
8An example  is the approach  adopted  by Bond [  1996]. He develops  a simple  general  equilibrium
specification  of the effects  on Chile  of these preferential  trading arrangements  with an impressive  level of
detail with respect  to tariff  data. His results  for Chile  joining  NAFTA,  however,  differ  from ours, since  his
CGE model does not allow changes  in the price  of exports  or imports.  Thus, it does not incorporate  the
impact of the terms-of-trade  gain to Chile of access  to NAFTA  markets.
- 11  -domestic production and trade. Table 3 provides a summary of economic activity in Chile. The first
two columns show value added in millions of U.S. dollars and then as a percentage of aggregate
value added, respectively. In terms of production structure we see that Chile is a relatively evolved
country with 61% of its value added generated  by the trade and transport sectors and service sectors.
The next column shows the labor share of value added in each sector in percentage form, which is
an indicator of relative labor intensity in each sector.
The next two columns indicate the total value of exports and the share of aggregate exports
generated by each sector. Copper exports show up in two sectors, the mineral products sector and,
most prominently, in the non-ferrous metals sector. In addition we see that exports of non-grain
crops and food products are significant as a percent of aggregate exports. The final two columns
provide comparable data for Chile's imports in value terms and percentage terms. Imports tend to
be concentrated in capital intensive industries such as machinery and equipment, transport industries,
chemicals  and rubber and plastics, and textiles and apparel and leather products.  There are also
significant imports of energy, reflected in the energy products sector.
In Table 4 we examine the trade flows for Chile in more detail. The first column shows
exports in each sector as a fraction of domestic output and the second column shows imports in each
sector as a fraction of domestic demand, each as a percentage. We see that exports are particularly
important in non-ferrous metals and the small transportation and iron and steel sectors.
The third column in Table 4 shows the import-weighted tariff rate which is a constant 1  1%
across all traded sectors. This reflects the uniform legal tariff rate applied in Chile. 9 The model also
9Chile  applies  a variable levy  system  on imports of wheat, sugar  and edible oils. Monthly prices
over the previous  two years are examined  and the distribution is truncated at the top and the bottom by
- 12 -includes  some  small  export  taxes  on select  commodities  shown  in the fourth  column  of Table  4. The
last three columns of Table  4 show  export weighted  average  tariffs on Chile's  exports.  These are
import tariffs by other countries  on imports  from Chile  to them. The column  TXT_AVE  percent
shows  an export weighted  average  tariff across  all countries  to which  Chile currently  exports.
The next  two columns  show  the average  tariffs  applied  on Chile's  exports  to Brazil and the
United  States,  respectively.  These  are  important  indicators  of the tariff reductions  which Chile will
benefit from when it joins MERCOSUR  or NAFTA,  respectively.  Consider  first the tariffs which
Brazil applies on Chilean  imports,  noting also that the tariffs which Argentina  applies  on Chile's
imports are virtually identical.  It is interesting  to note  that in many manufacturing  sectors these
tariffs  are significantly  higher  than those  that Chile currently  applies  on a nondiscriminatory  basis.
This means  that Chile's  adoption  of the common  external  tariff of MERCOSUR,  to the extent  that
it is reflected  in the rates  which  are shown  for Brazil,  will entail  Chile  adopting  a more  protectionist
tariff structure  against  third countries  than  it currently  has.  Another  implications  of these  rates  being
so high is that Chile will benefit tremendously from their reduction to  zero once it joins
MERCOSUR.  Similarly  the import  tariff  rates  for the  United  States  on Chilean  exports  to the United
States are, in many sectors,  very high.
In terms  of Chile's  exports,  and only looking  at the items that are large  in absolute  size, we
see that the United States is a relatively important  trading partner. The United States is the
destination  of 29%  of Chile's  exports  of non-grain  crops, 10%  of its exports  of food products,  12%
an equal  percentage  (about  15%).  The range  of the resulting  truncated  distribution  determines  the upper
and lower  bounds.  A tariff  surcharge  or reduction  of the tariff  below  the 11%  rate is applied  if the price
in the present  month  is below  or above  the bounds.  Since  the system  is not based  on a domestic  support
price,  in practice  it has had only  a small  impact  on protection  (equal  to about  2-3  percent  of additional
tariff  protection)  which  we ignore  in the analysis.  See  Quiroz  and Valdes  [ 1993]  and Valdes  [ 1996].
- 13 -of its exports of lumber and wood, and 16% of its exports of non-ferrous metals. The other members
of NAFTA, Canada and Mexico, are not particularly important trading partners with Chile. Brazil
and Argentina are significant export destinations for some of Chile's significant exports. Brazil buys
10% of the Chile's exports of mining products. Argentina and Brazil jointly purchase 7% of the
Chilean exports of food, 15%  of pulp and paper products, 8% of the exports of non-ferrous metals,
and 15% of the exports of trade and transport services.
Turning to imports of Chile we see that the United States is even more important than it is
with respect to Chile's exports. From the United States, Chile imports 18% of its textile products,
3  1  % of its chemical and rubber and plastic products,  27% of its transportation equipment, 31% of
its machinery and equipment, and 30% of its imported services.  Argentina sells Chile 10% of Chile's
imports of energy products and 10% of its services imports. Brazil supplies 14% of Chile's imports
of transportation equipment.
In Table 5 we also provide details on domestic distortions in Chile. The first column, VAT,
represents a tax on value added in each industry. The second column, TY, represents a tax on gross
output.  These rates were estimated using procedures explained in the appendix./
B. Formal Specification
The general specification of the model follows our earlier work on the Uruguay Round (see
Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr [1995] [1996a] [1997, forthcoming].  We concentrate here on what
we have called our "base" model, which is static and assumes constant returns to scale (CRTS).
Except for the fact that imports and exports are distinguished by many regions, the structure of the
model within any country is very close to that of the basic model of de Melo and Tarr [1992]; the
- 14 -interested reader may consult their chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the equations.
Except for tariff data and the domestic tax data, the data employed to calibrate the model
come  primarily  from the GTAP database documented in  Gehlhar et al.  [1996].  We use the
preliminary release of version 3 of this database, current as of May 1996. The 1  1-region version of
the model retains all the regions of the GTAP database that are directly relevant to  our policy
simulations. The sectors were selected such that those in which significant reduction in distortions
occurred are retained as individual sectors. This should minimize aggregation bias.
In appendix C we formally characterize the demand structure and elasticities which are
critical to the results. Demand is characterized by nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
utility functions for each agent, which allow multi-stage budgeting. Demand at the top level, for the
composite "Armington" aggregate of each of the 24 goods in Table 1, is Cobb-Douglas. Consumers
first  choose  how much of each Armington aggregate good to consume, like wheat, subject to
aggregate incomes and composite prices of the aggregate goods. The Armington aggregate good is
in turn a CES composite of domestic production and aggregate imports. Consumers decide how
much to spend on aggregate imports and the domestic good subject to the prior decision of how
much income will be spent on this sector and preferences for aggregate imports and domestic goods
reflected by the CES utility function. Finally, consumers decide how to allocate expenditures across
imports from the 10 other regions based on their CES utility function for imports from different
regions and income allocated to consumption on imports from the previous higher level decision.
Relying on our a priori beliefs as to plausible values for these elasticities, we generally
assume that the lower-level elasticity of substitution between imports from different regions acM  is
30 and the higher-level elasticity between aggregate imports and domestic production aDM  is 15. We
- 15 -refer to these values as our central elasticities. Although the majority of econometric studies suggest
values which are lower than these (see Reinert and Roland-Holst [1992] and Shiells and Reinert
[1993]), the studies by Reidel [1988] and Athukorala and Reidel [1994] argue that when the model
is properly specified, the elasticities are not statistically different from infinite and their point
estimates are close to the central elasticity values we have chosen. Moreover, elasticities would be
expected to increase over time, and this model presumes an adjustment of about 10 years, a rather
long period in the context of these econometric estimates.
Another reason we adopt these elasticities as our preferred values is that low values of these
elasticities will imply that small open economies have significant market power on world markets,
and are able to significantly improve their terms-of-trade and welfare through raising protection.
This implication is counterintuitive with casual empiricism, as a broad range of Chilean economists
expressed the view that the Chilean optimal tariff for any product would be very low.'" In fact, we
show in appendix C that the optimal tariff t' is bounded below by t'-  {[OJ(OM-1)] - 1}. Thus, even
with a.  = 30, the optimal tariff is slightly over 3%. For those who believe that a small open
economy like Chile cannot have a significant optimal tariff, the logical implication in this Armington
specification is that they believe that these elasticities are quite high.  To be clear, a value of oa  =
30 means that if Chile tried to raise its prices by 1 percent on world markets relative to an average
of aggregate imports, Chilean imports would decline relative to aggregate imports by 30 percent.
Given that there may be some economists who would prefer elasticities based on the econometric
'OA  small  amount of computational  inaccuracy  is introduced  with elasticities  of  substitution as high
as 30; so welfare  results for example,  may not be precise  beyond tenths of a percent of GDP.
- 16 -estimates yielding lower elasticity estimates, despite the discomforting implications for the optimal
tariff, we also perform most of our important policy simulations with a.  = 8 and aDM  = 4.  We refer
to these as our low elasticities. A high elasticity scenario for a small open economy such as Chile
would be a specification with still less market power for exports.
Production entails the use of intermediate inputs and primary factors (Labor, Capital and
Land). Primary factors are mobile across sectors within a region, but are internationally immobile.
Each region has a single representative consumer, as well as a single govemment agent. We assume
CES production functions for value added" 1 , and Leontief production functions for intermediates and
the value added composite.  Exports are not differentiated by country of destination.
All distortions are represented as ad valorem price-wedges. These include factor taxes in
production,  value-added  taxes,  import  tariffs' 2,  export  subsidies,  voluntary  export  restraints
(represented as ad valorem export tax equivalents)  and non-tariff barriers (represented  as ad valorem
import tariff equivalents).  Lump-sum replacement  taxes or subsidies ensure that government revenue
in each region stays constant at real benchmark levels. For Chile, however, we capture the marginal
efficiency cost of the government having to raise extra revenues through a distortionary domestic
tax system. For developing countries these costs could be quite significant, since the revenue losses
from trade reform could be sizeable.
"  The elasticities of substitution for these value added production functions are taken from
Harrison,  Rutherford  and Wooton [1991;  Table 1, p.101], which are unpublished  estimates  by Harrison,
Jones, l(imbell and Wigle [1993] from time-series  data for the United States between 1947 and 1982.
Contrary  to many of the estimates  employed  in the CGE literature, the econometric  specification  used in
this case corresponds  to the functional  form assumed in the model.
" 2We  also employ  ancillary  data on the bilateral tariffs  of Chile,  Argentina and Brazil  with all of
the regions in the GTAP database. These data are described  in Appendix B.
- 17 -4. Policy Results for Chile
Since  it has a rather important impact on the welfare results, and the implications  for
government revenue are important in their own right, in this section we first discuss how Chile will
replace the revenue it will lose from lowering its tariffs. Next we discuss the results of several
simulations  in our model to evaluate the preferential trade area policy options which have been
discussed in Chile.  Finally we consider related policies that Chile may adopt to optimize its trade
policy options.
A. The Role of the Replacement Tax
Since Chile  is reducing tariffs in most  of our scenarios there is a  revenue loss to the
government. We impose a revenue neutral requirement in all simulations, and stipulate explicitly
how the additional tax revenue will be generated. We employ either the existing VAT, a uniform
VAT or a "Lump Sum" tax. First we discuss the welfare impact of the different replacement tax
options and then the revenue impact.
Welfare Effects of the Replacement Tax.  Collection of the existing VAT is not uniform
in Chile: according to our estimates in Table 5, it ranges from 0 to 18 percent across sectors. Hence,
raising revenue through the VAT generates distortions. That is, the VAT discriminates against the
sectors with high effective VAT rates and, when increased, moves resources into less highly taxed
sectors. This reduces any possible gains from the trade policy change. Results for welfare using the
existing VAT are presented in column 1 of Table 1.
- 18 -In fact, we have estimated the "marginal excess burden" (MEB) of the existing VAT in Chile
to be equal to 7.6%. This implies that every extra 1000 pesos of revenue generated by raising the
VAT results in an additional welfare loss, apart from the 1000 pesos transferred to government, of
76 pesos.  In other words, consumers and producers will have to be taxed 1076 pesos for the
government to receive 1000 pesos. The 76 pesos are simply lost to the Chilean economy.
We have also calculated  the MEB of the Chilean tariff, and it equals 18.5%. Despite the fact
that the tariff is uniform across sectors, and therefore imposes no intersectoral distortion costs, the
Chilean  tariff  imposes a higher distortion cost than the VAT. This is because it discriminates
geographically favoring domestic production over imports, whereas the VAT does not.
In column 5 of Table  1, we show the results of employing a "LUMP SUM" tax as the
replacement tax. This tax avoids the distortions  of a non-uniform  VAT since the MEB for lump-sum
tax replacement is, by definition, zero. Consumer income is taxed in a fixed amount independently
of consumer choices, so that no resource allocation is affected. Hence we would expect that there
would be an added welfare cost of using the VAT, as compared to the lump-sum alternative, to
replace revenues. This is exactly what our overall welfare results show.
Finally,  in column 3 of Table 1 we show the results of using a uniform VAT. In these
scenarios we first counterfactually create an equilibrium in which all other domestic taxes and
subsidies are zero and the VAT is uniform. The impact we evaluate is then due to the trade policy
change alone. The uniform VAT will be a distortionless  tax in our model. Since all sectors are taxed,
and there is no labor-leisure choice, there is no way to take an action that will lower the tax. In other
words, there are no resource allocation effects and the uniform VAT is essentially equivalent to a
Lump Sum tax in our model. In addition, any "second best" interaction effects of distortions between
- 19  -the tariff and the existing VAT will be removed if we start with a uniform VAT (for this reason the
results for the Lump Sum tax and the uniform VAT may differ). In these scenarios, we equalize the
VAT across sectors and solve for the level of the VAT that is required to compensate for the lost
revenues.
Revenue Effects.
In column 2 of Table 1 we present the equiproportional increase in the VAT required to keep
government  revenue  constant.  For  example, with  central elasticities  a  free  trade  area  with
MERCOSUR  will require a 45 % increase in the VAT rate across sectors. That means if the
collected VAT rate is 10% in a sector (see Table 5), the collected VAT rate will have to increase to
14.5% percent. With central elasticities there is a strong substitution away from imports that pay
tariffs in favor of imports from partner countries that are tariff free. Then the revenue requirements
for the VAT are quite high in order to compensate for the lost tariff revenues. With low trade
elasticities the revenue requirement for the VAT is much smaller, ranging from an increase between
17% and 26% in the three basic preferential trade arrangement scenarios presented in rows 1-3.
In columns 4 and 7 we show tariff revenues collected in the new equilibrium as a percentage
of GDP. In our initial equilibrium, tariff revenues are equal to about 3.6% of GDP, but in the
preferential trade area scenarios (rows 1-3), they fall to between 0.9% and 2.7% of GDP. Thus, in
the preferential trade area scenarios, tariff revenues fall to between 25% and 75% of original tariff
revenues. The loss of tariff revenue is higher with NAFTA (because NAFTA is a larger share of
Chilean imports than MERCOSUR) and higher with central elasticities because of the greater trade
diversion. Since the VAT revenues as a percentage of GDP constitute about 9% of GDP initially and,
- 20 -depending on the preferential trade area and elasticities,  the tariff loss is between 0.9% and 2.7% of
GDP,  if the VAT is employed as the replacement tax, it will be necessary for VAT revenues to
increase by about 10% to 30%.
Some may question that the implied increase in the VAT is too high. To provide intuition
for the model implications for the VAT, consider a particular scenario where the lost tariff revenue
is about 2.5% of GDP, as in row 6 with central elasticities. It is estimated in Table 1 that the VAT
rate will have to increase by 45% to a legal rate of about 26%. In 1994 the legal VAT rate of 18%
generated  VAT revenues of about 9% of GDP, i.e., the legal rate was twice the collected rate.
Assuming no change in the rate of VAT evasion, it will be necessary to raise the VAT by 5% to
generate 2.5% of GDP, i.e., from 18% to 23%. But the model predicts a required increase of the
VAT rate to 26%, not 23%? The reason the model predicts an extra 3% increase in the legal VAT
rate is that an increase in the tax will  induce a shift away from the highly taxed sectors and an
erosion of the tax base. Given model parameters, increases in the VAT continue to generate additions
in revenue within the range under consideration; but it is possible a more realistic representation of
the VAT in Chile would incorporate an increase in evasion rates with increases in the VAT rate or
simply that the rate of VAT collection can not be increased in some sectors. Then the required legal
VAT rate increase and distortion costs of revenue replacement would be still higher than we have
estimated, or possibly the VAT is not a feasible tax to generate considerably more revenue with
further reform in collection procedures.3 Given the uncertainties of rates of evasion of VAT in
1 3To quantify  these ideas,  we have simulated  Chile's FTA  with MERCOSUR  and NAFTA  where
we assume  that the services  and trade and transportation  sectors can not have their collected  VAT  rates
increased  due to evasion.  (These  are the sectors  with low  rates  of VAT  collection  and where evasion  of the
VAT  may  prevent  additional  collections;  together  they  produce  about 65% of Chilean  value-added.)  Then,
with central elasticities,  the welfare  loss from the FTA  with MERCOSUR  is increased  to -0.60% of GDP
- 21 -Chile,  these  estimates should  be  taken as  indicative of  revenue requirements  rather than  as
recommendations for the VAT rate. In fact, below we emphasize the importance of uniformity of
collections.
B. Preferential Trade Area Options
The overall welfare results for the trade policy options are presented in Table  1.  More
detailed results on output, imports and exports for the main scenarios are displayed in Table 6.
Welfare impacts are presented as a percent of GDP of Chile. They represent changes on a recurring,
annual basis, so a 1% welfare gain should be interpreted as a 1% increase in real income each and
every year in the future.
In the first row of Table 1 we present the results from the scenario where Chile forms a free
trade area with MERCOSUR. We assume that each of the MERCOSUR countries represented in the
model, Argentina and Brazil, reduce their tariffs on Chile's imports to zero and that Chile reduces
its tariffs on imports from them to zero as well. None of the members of MERCOSUR are assumed
to impose any export taxes or subsidies on each other either. Consistent with the agreement between
Chile and the MERCOSUR customs union,  we assume that Chile does not adopt the common
external tariff  of MERCOSUR in this scenario.
The second scenario, shown in row 2, represents Chile joining MERCOSUR as part of the
customs union.  In addition to the requirements of the scenario in row 1, in this case Chile adopts
the common  external tariff of MERCOSUR. Although Chile has not joined  the MERCOSUR
and the gains from the FTA  with NAFTA  are reduced to 0.  12% of GDP. As expected,  the required rate
of VAT  increase must increase  to about 75%.
- 22 -customs union, it is a potential policy option so we evaluate it in this scenario. For simplicity, we
assume that the common external tariff that Chile adopts is thq import tariff structure that Brazil
currently has with the countries that are not in MERCOSUR.' 4
The third scenario, in row 3, is Chile forming a free trade area with NAFTA. In the scenario
in which Chile forms a free trade area with NAFTA, Chile and the NAFTA countries provide each
other tariff free access on trade with each other, but Chile retains its import tariffs against non-
member countries. In row 4, primarily to help understand  the results, we evaluate the consequences
of an agreement between Chile and NAFTA in which Chile does not obtain improved access to the
NAFTA market. After discussion of these scenarios,  we introduce further simulations to help explain
the results and evaluate modified options.
The effects on welfare are dependent on both how Chile chooses to replace the lost tariff
revenues and on assumed elasticities. Chile's preferential trade policy options with MERCOSUR
lead to a loss of welfare with our preferred central trade elasticities and negligible gains or losses
with low trade elasticities. With central trade elasticities, in terms of Figure 1, this means that the
trade diversion costs of an agreement with MERCOSUR typically dominate the trade creation
effects. Moreover, based on the MERCOSUR external tariff, preferential access to the markets of
'4This  tariff  structure is slightly  different  than the tariff structure  shown for Argentina.  There are
two reasons  for this. First,  there are exceptions  to the common  extemal tariff for Argentina  and Brazil,  as
both countries adapt their tariff schedules  over time to the agreed  common extemal tariff. In addition,
Argentina  and Brazil  could  well  have adopted  exactly  the same  common extemal  tariff at a detailed tariff
line level,  but have  different  trade shares across  these tariff lines. Then in aggregating  with the different
trade weights, the rates that appear in the GTAP  database have the 24 sector  level reflect  differences  in
these trade patterns, and need not reflect  differences  in the common  extemal tariff at the detailed tariff
line level. For ease  of comparison  we also assume  in our Chile  customs  union with MERCOSUR  scenario
that  Argentina adopts the  tariff of Brazil as its  common extemal tariff.  This provides a  clean
representation of the MERCOSUR  customs union for our purposes.
- 23 -MERCOSUR is insufficient to overcome this welfare loss in Chile's markets. Welfare losses are
lower  with  lower assumed  elasticities because the there  is less trade diversion when  Chile's
consumers are less willing to substitute MERCOSUR'S products for those of the rest of the world."
The results indicate that the customs union with MERCOSUR is an inferior outcome for
Chile compared with a free trade agreement with MERCOSUR. The difference between the two
policy  choices  is that  with the  customs union,  Chile  adopts the common  external tariff  of
MERCOSUR reflected in Brazil's tariff.  Inspection of Table 4 reveals that MERCOSUR's  tariff
structure is diverse compared with Chile's tariff (which is uniform). Since the welfare costs of trade
restrictions tend to increase disproportionately with the height of the tariff, Chile is better off with
its own uniform tariff.' 6
In comparing our results in rows 1-3 regarding Chile's preferential trade area options, the
most important result is that the FTA with NAFTA is beneficial to Chile while the others are likely
to present problems.  '
7 In order to ascertain the source of the gain to Chile from a FTA with NAFTA,
we performed the simulation in row 4 in which Chile lowers its tariffs against imports from NAFTA
countries but does not obtain improved access in NAFTA markets. Although this is not a policy
option that Chile would adopt, the results of row 4 show that Chile loses from preferential reduction
1"These  results  are consistent  with those of Donoso  and Hachette [ 1996]  and Muchnik,  Errazuriz
and Dominguez  [ 1996]. Based on the results of the Muchnik et al. study which focused  on agriculture,
Donoso and Hachette  estimated  that access  to the MERCOSUR  market would not offer significant  gains
to Chile.
1 6"Ramsey  optimal" tariffs  will  vary inversely  with the elasticity  of demand. Typically,  however,
departures  from uniformity  do not conform  with Ramsey  optimal  rules,  but rather with political economy
considerations.  Moreover,  in our model the Ramsey  optimal  tariff is uniform.
17These  results are consistent with results from the computable general equilibrium models of
Coeymans and  Larrain [1994]; Reinert and Roland-Holst [1996]; and Hinojosa-Ojeda, Lewis and
Robinson [  1995], all of whom found that Chile will  gain from a free trade area with NAFTA.
-24  -of its tariffs against NAFTA countries without reciprocal access to NAFTA markets.
In order to identify even more precisely the source of the access gains from the FTA with
NAFTA, we performed a simulation in which access to only one sector was not obtained: non-grain
crops. Our estimates of the tariff distortions in Table 4 suggest that the United States tariff is likely
to be central in this sector: there is a 20% tariff on non-grain crops." 8 We can consider the effects
of Chile joining NAFTA but assuming no change in U.S. tariffs on non-grain crops. In other words,
we can assume that Chile obtains access in all sectors except non-grain crops.  Although not shown
in  Table  1, if Chile fails to obtain preferential  access in non-grain  crops,  the welfare  gains of 0.82%
we obtained in the full access case (existing VAT replacement and central elasticities) now drop to
a welfare loss of -0.58%. Thus access in non-grain crops is crucial to welfare gains from NAFTA.'9
1 8Although the GTAP database  indicates that  the U.S. tariff on non-grain crops is 47%, we have
lowered this to 20% in our benchmark  equilibrium for two reasons. First, we prefer updated  estimates
where possible. The most important non-grain crops products for Chile are fruits and vegetables, and post-
Uruguay Round tariff rates for these products in the U.S. market are the relatively modest figures cited
below in this footnote; the higher protection estimates for these products in the GTAP database (averaging
56%) were derived from an average  of protection estimates  in the 1989-1994  period. Second, the U.S.
protection  on  these  products  varies with the  season. We have assumed  that  given production  in the
opposite hemispheres,  when Chilean fruits and vegetables  are ready for harvest  and export to the U.S.,
they  would typically face U.S. tariffs that are in the low range of the seasonal tariffs applied by the United
States.  Products included in the non-grain crops category of the GTAP database (along with the
estimated  tariff and  tariff  equivalent  of the  non-tariff barrier  in the  U.S.) are: sugar, 67%; oilseeds,
including peanuts,  25%; coffee, cocoa and tea, 0%; cotton, 31 %; vegetables (fresh, 0-25%; frozen,  17.5-
25%; dried, 25-35%, prepared and preserved,  13.6-14.7%);  fruits (fresh,  0-20%, dehydrated, 0.6-2.2%;
frozen,  0.7-14%;  juices,  0-31.3%;  jams  and pastes, 7.0-35%;  canned, 1.9-20%);  and other non-food  crops
(tobacco,  jute, etc), 19%.
The reduced estimates are closer to the estimates of Butlemann and Meller [1995, p376]. They
report that Chilean fresh,  frozen  and canned  vegetables  face  MFN tariff  rates in the United States ranging
from 9.5 to  17.5 percent (with a few percentage  reduction for the former two categories  where GSP
treatment applies),  and that Chilean fruits face United States MFN tariffs  from 1 to 10 percent.
1 9Since U.S. protection in milk products is also high, we examined the impact of denial of
improved  access  in NAFTA  markets  for Chilean  products  on both non-grain  crops  and milk  products.  Chile
exports very little milk products,  however, so the welfare result was only slightly more adverse for Chile
(-0.60% of GDP with central elasticities and existing VAT replacement) relative to denial of Chilean access
in non-grain  crops alone.
- 25 -These results demonstrate the importance of improved access emphasized by Wonnacott and
Wonnacott [1981]. Our results show that Chile can gain more from a FTA with NAFTA than it can
from global free trade, a result which is dependent on the fact that Chile starts with a low and
uniform tariff as we elaborate below. But Chile can expect to lose from any of the preferential trade
agreements we have considered if there is no improvement in access to partner country markets.
These results contrast with some others we have found for other small open economies
forming preferential trade areas with large markets, such as Morocco, Turkey and Tunisia with the
European Union (e.g., see Rutherford, Rutstrbm and Tarr [1993] and Harrison, Rutherford and Tarr
[1  996b]). One important reason for the difference in results with these other countries is that Chile
has  a  low  and  uniform  tariff.  That is,  although it  is not  true as  a  general proposition,  the
implementation  of a preferential trade agreement in a country that starts with a dispersed tariff
structure may result in a reduction in the dispersion of the tariff structure. Potential benefits from a
reduction in the dispersion of the tariff, however, are ignored in more aggregated  theoretical analyses
of preferential  trade arrangements, such as that of Figure  1"2°  To verify this intuition we have
counterfactually created an initial equilibrium in which Chile applies a 22% tariff on one-half of its
imports and a zero tariff on all others, and then implemented the policy scenarios in rows  1-4 of
Table 1 (where we have employed existing VAT replacement and central elasticities). The sectors
with the high tariffs were selected at random and the experiment was repeated 206 times. The means
20There is value in further theoretical work into the generality of the impact of preferential
arrangements on uniformity, as well as the gains from moving  to uniformity when tariffs depart from
uniformity for political economy  reasons.  We know that if elasticities  are not equal, "Ramsey"  optimal
revenue  producing  tariffs  are not uniform.  In our model, however,  elasticities  are equal across  sectors, so
the Ramsey  optimal tariff is uniform.  A useful exercise  would be to evaluate  the impact of a preferential
trade arrangement  where we start from randomly selected  elasticities  across sectors, and see how often
Chile gains from preferential trade agreements  as we use a large number of distinct sets of elasticities.
- 26 -of the distributions for welfare as a percent of GDP are as follows: free trade area with MERCOSUR,
-0.56%; customs union with MERCOSUR, -0.44%; free trade area with NAFTA, 1.47%; and free
trade area with NAFTA  but no improved access, -0.52%.
The  gains the free trade area with NAFTA are significantly larger when based on the
hypothetical  non-uniform initial tariff  structure and the losses from  the free trade  area with
MERCOSUR are slightly smaller, reflecting a movement toward uniformity. But losses from a
preferential reduction of tariffs toward the NAFTA markets remain  (albeit at a lower level) unless
access to NAFTA market is obtained.
In this hypothetical experiment in which Chile starts with a diverse tariff structure, we find
that  the  ranking  of  the  customs  union  with  MERCOSUR  versus  the  free  trade  area  with
MERCOSUR is reversed compared with the actual situation represented by Table 1. Although Chile
still loses from both preferential trade agreements  with MERCOSUR, it is intuitive that the customs
union  produces  less  losses  than the  free trade  area  because the  common  external  tariff  of
MERCOSUR is more uniform than the Chilean tariff in this hypothetical situation. In the actual
situation  of Table  1, the customs union with MERCOSUR represents a movement away from
uniformity.
Thus, a key to understanding the results for Chile is to recognize that, contrary to many other
countries implementing preferential trade agreements, Chile starts with a relatively distortionless
external trade regime.  Not only is their low average tariff important, but the uniformity is also
important. Then, there is relatively little Chile can do to improve resource allocation within Chile
through  preferential  trade  arrangements. Significant gains  can only  come through  improved
preferential access as well as improvements in its domestic tax structure.
- 27 -Finally, we note that our model assumes perfect competition.  Rutherford and Tarr [1997]
have shown that when imperfect competition and the dynamic gains from trade are taken into
consideration,  there may be large additional gains from liberalizing  trade with a large technologically
advanced country. Reducing protection against such a country could induce additional imports of
technologically advanced products (or additional varieties) that would lower production costs and
increase incomes in the importing country (Romer [1993] has made a similar argument). This would
indicate  that  a  multilateral  trade  liberalization  or  a  preferential  trade  arrangement  with  a
technologically developed region such as NAFTA would provide additional benefits to Chile in
addition to those estimated here.
C. Optimizing Chile's Trade Policy Options
In rows 5-9 of Table 1, we evaluate a number of trade and tax options that are open to Chile.
Consistent with intuition gleaned from Figure 1, we know that Chile can reduce the trade diversion
costs of  preferential trade areas if  it lowers its external tariff. Thus,  a number of economists
(including Schiff [1996], Corbo [1996] and Leipziger and Winters [1996]), have recommended that
Chile combine a reduction of its tariff on third countries with any possible free trade agreements.
In rows 5 and 6 we evaluate the two free trade area options with a simultaneous reduction of the
tariff to 6%.  In rows 7 and 8 we evaluate the impact of lowering the external tariff to 8% and 6%
on a multilateral basis. We evaluate going to global free trade in row 9.
Before  discussing  the  estimates  of  the  benefits  of  unilateral  and  multilateral  trade
liberalization in rows 7, 8 and 9, we first explain why Chile may have a small optimal tariff despite
being a small country. If Chilean exports are differentiated from the products of other countries so
- 28 -that Chile in aggregate faces a downward sloping demand curve for a product (even if individual
Chilean producers do not perceive a downward sloping demand curve), then there will be an optimal
export tax to maximize Chilean export profits. The height of the optimal export tax will be inversely
related to the elasticity of demand faced by Chile in world markets, 2' which is in turn determined by
how substitutable Chile's  products are with those of other countries. In the limit, when Chilean
products are perfect substitutes in all its export markets for products from all other countries, Chile
has no ability to obtain a higher price by restricting its exports; so the optimal export tax is zero.
Although  Chile imposes virtually no export taxes, we know from the Lemer symmetry
theorem that import tariffs are equivalent to export taxes.  Since we must have equilibrium in the
balance of trade, any reduction in exports must equal the reduction in imports, and conversely.
Hence an import tariff can be employed to exploit any market power Chile will have on its exports.'
It is for this reason that Chile may have an optimal import tariff.
In our central elasticity scenarios we have assumed that all countries have an elasticity of
substitution between imports from different countries (ao)  equal to 30.23  Then there will be very
little market power for Chile in its export markets, because if it raises the price of its products, other
countries  will rapidly  shift to  alternate  suppliers. Nonetheless, even  in our  central  elasticity
2'lndividual  competitive  firms will  price at their marginal  costs, but since the country as a whole
must accept a lower price to sell more, there is an optimal export tax that equates the marginal  revenue
received  from exports equal to the marginal  costs.  The more elastic  the demand, the lower the optimal
export tax.
22An  import tariff  will  appreciate  the real  exchange  rate by restraining  imports.  Then exporters  will
receive less in terms of domestic goods for a unit of exports, and exports will decrease to achieve
equilibrium  with the lower  value of imports.
23This means that in Chile's export markets,  if Chilean prices become 10% cheaper relative to
prices  of other imports,  demand for Chile's  exports  will  increase  by 300%  relative  to the demand for other
imports.
- 29 -scenarios, Chile does not face a perfectly elastic demand curve. We show in the appendix that the
optimal tariff t' is bounded below by t = {[a,,j(o,-l)]  - 1}. Thus, even with a.  = 30 the optimal
tariff is over 3%; but in our low elasticity scenarios, with a,,b,  = 8, the optimal tariff is over 14%. In
our alternate high elasticity model formulation, the optimal tariff is virtually zero.
Considering the preferential  trade options in rows 5 and 6, we see that there is the expected
increase in the estimated  welfare gains compared with rows 1 and 3, respectively. With central
elasticities there is a significant  improvement in welfare compared with an 1  1% external tariff; with
low elasticities, the adverse terms-of-trade effect of reducing tariffs mitigates the welfare gain from
reducing the trade diversion costs.  This shows that as long as Chile limits itself to a free trade area
it can profit from the increased access it obtains in its partner countries without excessive trade
diversion costs, provided it lowers its external tariff sufficiently.
In rows 7 and 8 we present the estimates of the welfare and replacement tax implications to
Chile  of  unilaterally  and  multilaterally  lowering  its  external.  With  central  elasticities  and
distortionless domestic taxes (Lump Sum or uniform VAT), multilateral reduction of the tariff to 6%
increases welfare, and there are further gains from reducing tariffs from 8% to 6%. With the existing
VAT as the replacement tax, reducing the tariff to 8% increases welfare, but the distortion costs of
the VAT are sufficiently close to the tariff that combined with the small adverse terms of trade
effects, there are no further gains from tariff reduction below 8%. With a distortionless replacement
tax, reduction of the external tariff to zero produces positive welfare gains compared with the 11  %
- 30 -tariff (row 9); but since the gains are less than reduction to 6% (row 8) the optimal tariff is between
0 and 6%.24
With existing VAT replacement there is some limited scope for beneficial reduction of the
tariff with central elasticities.  Again, with higher elasticities,  the optimal tariff is lower and the gains
from tariff reduction would increase.
D. Sectoral Impacts
In Tables 6 and 7 we present the impacts on output, exports and imports at the 24-sector
level from three of the principal trade policy options: the free trade area with MERCOSUR, the free
trade area with NAFTA, and multilateral reduction of the tariff to 8%. Focusing on the percentage
change in output with central elasticities, the sectors that significantly expand with the free trade
agreement with MERCOSUR are transportation  (dramatically), 25 machinery and equipment, iron and
steel, and milk. With the free trade agreement with NAFTA the sectors that expand more than 10%
are: iron and steel, transportation equipment, milk, non-grain crops, and textiles. With multilateral
tariff reduction the expanding sectors are transportation equipment, iron and steel, and to a lesser
extent non-ferrous metals and mining.
Iron and steel and transportation equipment expand under all three trade policy options, but
the other expanding sectors differ. Iron and steel and transportation  equipment are both small sectors
241n fact, we have separately  calculated  the optimum tariff  with central elasticities  at between 3
and 4% and with the low  elasticities  about 14%,  assuming  Lump Sum replacement  of tariff revenues  in
each case.
25Although  the expansion  is dramatic in percentage  terms, it is starting from a very small base.
Thus the absolute increase  is plausible.
- 31 -in Chile; in Table 3 we note that each sector produces less than 1% each of Chilean value-added.
However, these are the two sectors that export the most intensively; both export over 90% of their
output (see Table 4). Either preferential or multilateral tariff reduction induces a depreciation of the
real exchange rate, which makes exporting more profitable and gives a boost to the sectors which
export intensively.
With multilateral tariff reduction the other sectors which expand (non-ferrous metals and
mining) are also the ones that export a high percentage of their output. So the real exchange rate
impact and export intensity explains well the pattern of expanding and contracting sectors with
multilateral tariff reduction.
With a free trade agreement with NAFTA, textiles, milk and non-grain crops expand, in
addition  to the two or three most export intensive sectors, because these three sectors obtain a
substantial improvement in their terms-of-trade in the U.S. market. We have discussed earlier how
improved access to non-grain crops and milk is crucial to an improvement in Chilean welfare from
NAFTA, and these sectoral results are consistent with those welfare results.
With the free trade agreement with MERCOSUR, machinery and equipment and milk expand
in addition to transportation and iron and steel. Our data (see Table 4) indicate that these two sectors
are two of the most highly protected in MERCOSUR, so these sectors obtain relatively greater
improvement  in  their  terms-of-trade  after  implementation  of  a  free  trade  agreement  with
MERCOSUR, which induces their expansion.
- 32 -5. Conclusions
Butlemann and Meller [1995] have articulated the  strategy of  the government of Chile
which  is to  negotiate bilateral  free trade  agreements with  many  governments, especially  its
significant and willing trading partners. This they argue will progressively lower the effective
average tariff and, crucially, will help to assure stability of access to the markets of partner countries.
The free trade agreement in late 1996 between Chile and Canada in which both countries agreed to
eschew antidumping actions against each other is regarded as a notable example of the advantages
that the bilateral approach offers. An opposing view within Chile is offered by Donoso and Hachette
[1996] who argue that the limited market access of at least some of the bilateral agreements (e.g.
MERCOSUR) is not worth delaying the benefits of opening up unilterally and multilaterally, and
they fear that some bilateral arrangements may restrict broader opening up.
Our results provide some insight into this debate, but are not definitive. We show that
without  complementary reduction  of the external tariff, the  MERCOSUR agreement  will be
counterproductive, i.e., undisciplined bilateralism has problems. On the other hand, we show that
the free trade agreement with NAFTA offers more gains than any of the unilateral options, largely
due to the benefits of preferential access to the U.S. market. But Chile is foregoing the benefits of
unilateral and multilateral trade liberalization in the short to medium term for the prospect of gains
in the future of a free trade area that includes the United States. Whether this tradeoff will prove
beneficial is beyond the scope of our model.
- 33 -References
Athukorala, Premachandra, and Reidel, James, "Demand and Supply Factors in the Determination  of NIE Exports: A
Simultaneous Error-Correction  Model for Hong Kong: A Comment,"  Economic Journal, 104 (November), 1994,
1411-1414.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, and Panagariya,  Arvind, "Preferential  Trading Areas and Multilateralism:  Strangers, Friends or Foes?"
in J. Bhagwati  and A. Panagariya  (eds.) The Economics  ofPreferential  Trade  Arrangements  (Washington  D.C.: The
American Enterprise Institute  Press, 1996).
Bond, Eric, "Using Tariff Indices to Evaluate Preferential  Trading Arrangements:  An Application to Chile," Unpublished
Manuscript,  Department  of Economics,  Pennsylvania  State University,  January 24, 1996.
Butlemann,  Andrea;  Meller, Patricio,  "Evaluation  of a Chile-U.S.  Free  Trade  Agreement,"  in Economic  Commission  for Latin
America, Trade Liberalization  in the Western  Hemisphere (Washington  D.C.: Economic  Commission  for Latin
America, 1995).
Coeymans,  Juan Eduardo;  Larrain,  Felipe  B., "Efectos  de Un Acuerdo de Libre Comercio  Entre Chile Y Estados Unifos: Un
Enfoque  de Equilbrio General,"  Cuadernos  de Economia, 31(94), Deciembre  1994,  357-399.
Corbo, Vittorio,  "Commentario  a 'La integracion  de al NAFTA: Temos elgidos,"' in Schiff, Maurice, and Sapelli, Claudio
(eds.), Chile en el NAFTA: Acuerdos de Libre Comercio Versus Liberalizacion Unilateral  (Santiago:  Centreo
International  Para El Desarrollo  Economico,1996).
Donoso, B.; Hachette, Dominique,  "MERCOSUR  y la apertura  comercial chilena," Paper presented to the Chilean Senate,
Unpublished  manuscript,  Department  of Economics,  Catolica University,  Santiago,  Chile, 1996.
Gehlhar, Mark; Gray, Denice; Hertel, Thomas W.; Huff, Karen; lanchovichina,  Elena; McDonald, Bradley J; McDougall,
Robert;  Tsigas,  Marinos  E., and Wigle,  Randall,  "Overview  of the GTAP Data Base," in T.W. Hertel (ed.), Global
Trade  Analysis: Modeling and Applications  (New York: Cambridge University  Press, 1996).
Hammond,  Peter J., and Sempere,  Jaime, "Limits to the Potential  Gains from Economic  Integration  and Other Supply Side
Policies," Economic  Journal, 105,  September 1995,  1180-1204.
Harberger, Amold, "Three Basic Postulates for Applied Welfare Economics:  An Interpretive  Essay," Journal of Economic
Literature, 9, 1971,  785-797.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Jones, Richard; Kimbell, Larry J., and Wigle, Randall, "How Robust Is Applied General Equilibrium
Analysis?"  Journal ofPolicy Modelling, 15(1), 1993,  99-115.
Harrison,  Glenn W.; Rutherford,  Thomas F., and Tarr,  David, "Piecemeal  Trade  Reform  in the Partially  Liberalized  Economy
of Turkey," World Bank  Economic Review, 7, May 1993, 191-217.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutherford, Thomas F., and Tarr, David G., "Increased Competition  and Completion  of the Market in
the European Community:  Static and Steady-State  Effects," Journal of Economic  Integration, 11(3), September
1996,  332-365.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutherford, Thomas F., and Tarr, David, "Quantifying  the Outcome  of the Uruguay Round," Finance
& Development,  32(4), December 1995,38-41.
Harrison,  Glenn W.; Rutherford,  Thomas  F., and Tarr, David G., "Quantifying  the Uruguay  Round," in W. Martin and L. Alan
Winters, The Uruguay Round and the Developing  Countries, Discussion  Paper No. 307, Washington, D.C.: The
- 34 -World Bank, 1995a.
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutherford,  Thomas  F., and Tarr,  David G., "Quantifying  the Uruguay  Round," Economic Journal, 107,
September 1997,  forthcoming.
Harrison,  Glenn W.; Rutherford,  Thomas F.,  and Taff,  David G., "Economic  Implications  for Turkey  of a Customs  Union with
the European  Union,"  Policy  Research Working  Paper 1599,  The World  Bank,  May 1996b;  forthcoming,  European
Economic Review (Papers  and Proceedings).
Harrison, Glenn W.; Rutherford, Thomas F., and Wooton, Ian, "The Economic Impact of the European Community,"
American Economic  Review (Papers & Proceedings),  79(2), May 1989,  288-294.
Harrison,  Glenn W.;  Rutherford,  Thomas  F., and Wooton,  Ian, "An Empirical Database  for a General  Equilibrium Model of
the European  Communities,"  Empirical  Economics,  16, 1991,  95-120; reprinted in J.Piggott and J. Whalley (eds.),
Applied General  Equilibrium (Heidelberg:  Physica-Verlag,  Studies in Empirical Economics, 1991).
Harrison,  Glenn W.; Rutherford,  Thomas  F., and Wooton,  Ian, "An Alternative  Welfare  Decomposition  for Customs  Unions,"
Canadian Journal of Economics,  26(4), November 1993,  961-968.
Harrison, Glenn W., and H.D. Vinod, "The Sensitivity Analysis of Applied General Equilibrium Models: Completely
Randomized  Factorial  Sampling  Designs", The Review of Economics  and Statistics, 74, May 1992,  357-362.
Hinojosa-Ojeda,  Raul; Lewis,  Jeffrey,  and Robinson,  Sherman,  "Convergence  and Divergence  Between  NAFTA, Chile and
MERCOSUR: Overcoming Dilemmas of  North and  South American Economic Integration," Unpublished
Manuscript, 1995.
Leipziger, Danny, and Winters, L. Alan, "Chile y el NAFTA: lecciones y orientaciones  futuras," in Schiff, Maurice, and
Sapelli,  Claudio  (eds.) Chile  en el NAFTA:  Acuerdos  de Libre  Comercio Versus  Liberalizacion  Unilateral  (Santiago:
Centro Intemacional  Para El Desarrollo  Economico,  1996).
Melo,  Jaime de, and Tarr, David,  General  Equilibrium  Analysis of US. Foreign Trade  Policy (Cambridge,  MA: MIT Press,
1992).
Miller,  Marcus H., and Spencer,  John E., "The  Static  Effects  of the UK Joining the EEC:  A General  Equilibrium Approach",
Review of Economic  Studies, 44, 1977,  71-93.
Morales, Jose Venegas, "Una matriz insumo-proucto  inversa  de la economia  chilena 1986,"  Serie de Estudios Econ6micos
No. 38, Banco Central de Chile, 1986.
Muchnik, Eugenia; Errazuriz,  L.F.; Dominguez,  J.I., "Efectos  de la asociation  de Chile al Mercosur en el sector agricola y
agroindustrial,"  Estudios Publicos, 63, 1996, 113-164.
Quiroz,  Jorge, and Valdes,  Alberto,  "Price  Bands for  Agricultural  Stablization:  The Chilean Experience,"  Washington,  D.C.:
The World Bank, mimeo, March 1993.
Reidel,  James, "The Demand  for  LDC Exports  of Manufactures:  Estimates  from Hong Kong,"  Economic  Journal,  98 (March),
1988, 138-148.
Reinert,  Kenneth  A., and Roland-Hoist,  David W., "Armington  Elasticities  for  United States  Manufacturing  Sectors,"  Journal
of Policy Modelling, 14(5), 1992,  631-639.
Reinert, Kenneth A., and Roland-Hoist,  David W., "Chilean Accession  to the NAFTA: General Equilibrium  Estimates," in
K. Fatemi (ed.) Western  Hemispheric  Economies  in the 21st Century,  Graduate School  of Business, Texas A&M
- 35  -University, Laredo,  Texas, 1996.
Rutherford, Thomas F., "Extensions of  GAMS For Complementarity and  Variational Problems Arising in Applied
Economics",  Economics  Working  Paper 92-9,  Department  of Economics,  University of Colorado at Boulder, 1992.
Rutherford, Thomas F., Rutstrom, E.E., and Tarr, David G, "Morocco's Free Trade Agreement with the  European
Community,"  Policy Research Working Paper 1173, The World Bank, May 1993; forthcoming, Economic
Modelling.
Rutherford, Thomas F., Rutstrom,  E.E., and Tarr, David G, "L'Accord de Libre Echange entre le Maroc et la CEE: Une
Evaluation Quantitative,"  Revue d'Economie  du Developpement,  2, 1994,  97-133.
Rutherford, Thomas and Tarr, David, "Blueprints,  Spillovers  and the Dynamic  Gains from Trade Liberalization  in a Small
Open  Economy,"  in R. Baldwin  and J. Francois  (eds.),  Dynamic  Issues in Applied Commercial  Policy  Analysis  (New
York: Cambridge University  Press, 1997  forthcoming).
Schiff, Maurice, "La Integration de Chile al NAFTA: Temas elegidos," in Schiff, Maurice, and Sapelli, Claudio  (eds.)
Chile en el NAFTA: Acuerdos  de Libre Comercio Versus  Liberalizacion Unilateral  (Santiago: Centro  hkfxaxr
Para El Desarrollo Economico, 1996).
Schiff, Maurice, and Sapelli, Claudio (eds.) Chile en el NAFTA: Acuerdos de Libre Comercio Versus Liberalizacion
Unilateral  (Santiago: Centro Intemacional  Para El Desarrollo  Economico, 1996).
Shah, Anwar, and Whalley, John, "Tax Incidence  Analysis of Developing  Countries: An Altemative View," World Bank
Economic Review, 5(3), September 1991,  535-552.
Shiells, C.R., and Reinert, K.A., "Armington  Models and Terms-of-Trade  Effects: Some Econometric  Evidence for North
America,"  Canadian Journal of Economics, 26(2), 1993,  299-316.
Valdes, Alberto,  "Joining  an Existing  Regional  Trading  Agreement  from the Perspective  of a Small Open Economy: Chile's
Accession to NAFTA and MERCOSUR,"  American  Journal ofAgricultural Economics, 77, 1292-1297, 1995.
Valdes,  Alberto,  "Surveillance  of Agricultural  Price  and Trade  Policy  in Latin America  during  Major Policy Reforms,"  World
Bank Discussion  Paper No. 349 (Washington  D.C.: The World Bank, 1996).
Wonnacott,  Paul, and Wonnacott,  Ronald,  "Is Unilateral  Tariff  Reduction  Preferable  to a Customs Union? The Curious Case
of the Missing Foreign Tariffs",  American  Economic Review, 71(4), September 1981,  704-714.
Wooton,  Ian, "Preferential  Trading Agreements:  An Investigation",  Journal ofInternational Economics, 21, 1986, 81-97.
L. Alan Winters, "The European Community:  A Case of Successful  Integration?" in J. De Melo and A. Panagariya (eds.),
New Dimensions in Regional Integration (New York: Cambridge  University Press, 1993).
c:\chile\paper\chile  I  O.wpd
- 36  -Table  1:  Welfare  and  Government  Revenue  Results  for  Chile's  Trade  Policy Options
With Replacement Taxes As:  Combined  Effect of
Existing VAT  Uniform VAT pi  Lump Sum  Uniform  VAT and .Trade  Policy  At
Policy Simulation  % change  % change  |  change  tariff revenue  %change  % change  tariff revenue
in welfare  c/  in VATd/  in welfare c/  % of GDP  in welfare  c/  in welfare  ci  % of GDP
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)
1. FTA with Mercosur  (central elasticities)  -0.62  45  -0.40  1.7  -0.43  -0.19  1.8
(low elasticities)  0.04  17  0.07  2.7  0.08  0.19  2.7
2.  Customs Union with Mercosur (central elasticities)  -0.95  52  -0.74  1.3  -0.73  -0.62  1.2
(low elasticities)  -0.20  21  -0.22  2.5  -0.17  -0.14  2.5
3.  FTA with NAFTA  (central elasticities)  0.82  48  1.03  0.9  1.04  1.23  0.9
(low elasticities)  0.30  26  0.31  2.1  0.38  0.43  2.1
4.  FTA with NAFTA, without improved access (central elasticities)  -1.11  62  -0.92  0.7  -0.83  -0.64  0.7
(low elasticities)  -0.47  30  -0.45  2.0  -0.41  -0.33  2.0
5.  FTA with Mercosur and 6%extemal  tariff(central elasticities)  0.12  49  0.44  1.7  0.35  0.61  1.7
(low elasticities)  0.06  38  0.11  1.7  0.13  0.21  1.7
6.  FlAwithNAFTAand6%extemaltariff(central  elasticities)  1.46  45  1.72  1.1  1.70  1.89  1.1
(low elasticities)  0.41  41  0.45  1.4  0.49  0.55  1.4
7.  Reduce extemal tariff to 8% (central elasticities)  0.02  16  0.12  2.9  0.10  0.41  2.9
(low elasticities)  -0.11  17  -0.08  2.7  -0.06  0.03  2.7
8.  Reduce external tariff to 6% (central elasticities)  0.01  28  0.16  2.3  0.11  0.43  2.3
(low elasticities)  -0.18  30  -0.14  2.1  -0.14  -0.04  2.1
9.  Reduce extemal tariff to zero (central elasticities)  -0.26  76  0.02  0  0.09  0.21  0
(low elasticities)  -0.54  72  -0.45  0  -0.42  -0.37  0
A/  In  these  scenarios,  we  first  create  an  equilibrium  with  a uniform  VAT,  no other  domestic  taxes,  then  evaluate  the  "pure"  effects  of  the  trade  policy.
E  These  scenarios  combine  the  impacts  of  the  trade  policy  simulation  with  going  to a uniform  VAT  and  elimination  of  the  domestic  output  tax,  government  revenues  held  constant.
c/  Percntage change  in Hicksian  equivalent  variation  as a percentage  of  GDP.
d/  Required  equiproportional  increase  in the VAT  rate  across  all  seetors  to keep  govemment  revenues  unchanged.
-37 -Table 2: Commodities,  Regions & Factors of Production  in the Chile Model
Commodities
WHT  Wheat
GRO  Other  Grains
NGC  Non-grain  crops
WOL  Wool  and Other  livestock
FRS  Forestry
FSH  Fishing
ENR  Energy  products
MIN  Mineral  products
MEA  Meat  products
MIL  Milk  products
FOO  Other  food  products
B_T  Beverages  and  tobacco
TEX  Textiles  and  apparel  and  leather  products
LUM  Lumber  and  wood
PPP  Pulp  and  paper
CRP  Chemicals  rubber  and plastics
I S  Primary  ferrous  metals
NFM  Non-ferrous  metals
FMP  Fabricated  metal  products
TRN  Transport  industries
MAC  Machinery  and  equipment
T T  Trade  and  transport
SER  Services





RSM  Rest  of  South  America
USA  United  States  of America
CAN  Canada
MEX  Mexico
CAM  Central  America  and  Caribbean
E U  European  Union  15
JPN  Japan





- 38 -Table  3: Structure  of Economic Activity in Chile
VA  Value  added  net of tax  (S millions)
VA%  Sectoral  value  added  as a percent  of aggregate  value  added
LVS%  Labor  share  of value  added,  in percentage  form
EXPORT  Value  of exports
EXPORT%  Sector  exports  as a percent  of aggregate  exports
IMPORT  Value  of imports
IMPORT%  Sector  imports  as a percent  of aggregate  imports
Sectors  VA  VA%  LVS%  EXPORT  EXPORT%  IMPORT  IMPORT%
-------------------------------------------------------------- __-------------__--------
WHT  171  1  30  92  1
GRO  76  30  32  75  1
NGC  1428  6  37  1413  11  187  1
WOL  520  2  30  31  20
FRS  132  1  29  93  1  1
FSH  411  2  51  548  4  9
ENR  507  2  39  39  1381  10
MIN  1185  5  45  1542  12  227  2
MEA  97  66  27  93  1
MIL  60  46  7  74  1
FOO  516  2  48  1108  9  307  2
B_T  130  1  66  144  1  74  1
TEX  312  1  61  206  2  1004  7
LUM  356  2  45  510  4  57
PPP  405  2  49  739  6  275  2
CRP  548  2  58  435  3  1633  11
I S  16  45  75  1  391  3
NFM  930  4  45  3194  25  89  1
FMP  213  1  61  63  270  2
TRN  22  53  148  1  2325  16
MAC  80  71  232  2  3817  27
T T  4753  21  41  1240  10  886  6
SER  10104  44  61  832  7  1092  8
Source:  GTAP  Database  (version 3, preliminary)and  model  assumptions.
- 39 -Table 4: Structure  of International  Trade  in Chile
EXPORT%  Sector  exports  as  a  percentage  of  domestic  output
IMPORT%  Sector  imports  as  a  percentage  of  domestic  demand
TM_AVE%  Import-weighted  tariff  rate  (%)
TX  AVE%  Export-weighted  export  tax  rate  (%)
XT  AVE%  Export-weighted  average  tariff  applied  to  Chilean  exports  (%)
TXT  BRA%  Tariff  applied  to  Chilean  exports  by  Brazil  (%)
TXT_USA%  Tariff  applied  to  Chilean  exports  by  USA  (%)
Sector  EXPORT%  IMPORT%  TM_AVE%  TX_AVE%  TXT_AVE%  TXT_BRA%  TXT_USA%
WHT  17  11  5  5
GRO  16  30  11  23  8
NGC  44  9  11  42  6  20
WOL  2  2  11  3  5  3
FRS  32  11  6  2
FSH  43  1  11  7  10  4
ENR  1  29  11  9
MIN  41  9  11  1  6  4
MEA  2  7  11  114  11  13
MIL  1  12  11  33  16  92
FOO  24  8  11  9  11  7
B  T  16  9  11  20  17  9
TEX  9  33  11  4  23  16  16
LUM  40  7  11  5  12  2
PPP  42  21  11  4  8
CRP  14  39  11  2  12  9  7
I_S  91  98  11  11  12  11
NFM  74  7  11  3  7  5
FMP  5  20  11  21  16  2
TRN  99  100  11  21  17  2
MAC  39  91  11  15  15  5
T T  9  7  11
SER  4  5  11  9
Source:  GTAP  Database,  version  3  (preliminary)  and  World  Bank  calculations
- 40 -Table 5: Benchmark Domestic Tax Rates in Chile (percent)
Sectors  VAT  TY
_______________________________
WHT  17.2  2.7
GRO  17.2  2.7
NGC  16.8  2.8
WOL  3.8  0.6
FRS  1.8  1.3
FSH  6.9  0.8
ENR  14.2  12.1
MIN  0.3
MEA  18.0  -0.1
MIL  18.0  0.3
FOO  18.0  0.1
B T  18.0  27.6
TEX  18.0  0.5
LUM  18.0  0.9
PPP  18.0  0.7
CRP  14.2  0.5
I_S  6.1  0.8
NFM  17.6  0.9
FMP  11.5  0.2
TRN  9.8  -1.3
MAC  10.3  0.7
T_T  2.8  2.2
SER  3.0  2.2
Source:  Appendix  A.
-41-Table  6: Effects of Policies on Chilean  Production  and  Trade
Central  Elasticities and Existing VAT Replacement
OUTPUT: Percent  change jn  domestically  Produced output  in  ChiLe
EXPORT: Percent  change In  ChjLean exports
IMPORT: Percent  change In  Chilear  jmports
IMP ARG:  Percent  change In  Argent  nian  imports -BPRA:  Percent  change  In UBra;lipan  not
IMP-USA:  Percent  change in  US inports
Free Trade Area  with  Mercosur--centraL  elasticities  and existing  VAT replacement
OUJTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP_ARG  IMP-BRA  IMP-USA
WHlT  - ~  -1  -14  10
GRO  -2i  -18  36  6  -3  -2
HOC  -4  2  4  10  4
WOL  -16  14  9  - 3
FRS  -5  168  4
ENR2  -1  0  1
INe  3  A  IM  1  32
MEA  -6  12  4  -6
MIL  50  -2  -4
FOO  -11  -1  83  -1
B  T  1  18  13  10
TEX  -11  21  11  -1  -2
PHT  -9-439-
LUM  -1  -6  15
WOL  -2 
CRP  :$  18  2
HFN  1  35  2 
TFNP  25  25  9  2  |
MAC  1  164  -3  -4  4 T  T-  4  1
SiR  -1  10  A9
Free  Trade  Area  with  HAFTA-  -central  elasticities  and  existing  VAT  replacement
OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP  ARG  IMP-BRA  IMP-USA
HOC  46  98  4-1
WOL  -17  -28  34  :
FRS  -8  18  -1  -
FSH  1  -13
ENR  -4  11  -1
MNI  5  115 
MEA  -10  -236  -1  -2-1
NIL  81
FOO  -11  1
S  T  -1 
LUM  -9  -6  9
PPP-2  -261
CRP  -295  -8
I  S  771  45~
HF  9  13-1  -42
FMP  -11  -
TRH  123  123 
MAC  -13 
T  T  4i  :1-
Reduce  External  Tariffs  to  8  Percent--Central  eLasticities  and  Existing  VAT  replacement
OUJTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP  ARG  IMP-BRA
WHlT  -9  -4  19  -1
GRO  -8  1
HOC  1  -
WOL  -2  4 
FRS  1  7
FSH4 
MIL~~~~~~Table  7: Effects of Policies on Chilean  Production  and Trade
Low Elasticities  and Existing VAT Replacement
OUTPUT: Percent  change  in  domesticcalty  produced  output  in  Chile EXPORT:  Percent  change  in  Chilean  exports IMPORT:  Percent  change  In  CM lean  Irrt
IMP  ARG:  Percent  change  in  Arentjniag  irtsort INP-BRA:  Percent  change  In  Bra;itian  imports
IMP-USA:  Percent  change  in  US imports
Free  Trade  Area  with  MERCOSUR--Low  Elasticities  and  Existing  VAT  Replacement OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  IMP_ARG  IMP_BRA
NHT  -4  314  1 CR0  -7  17  NGC  -1  14  2 WOL  -1  5  10  2  FRS  4  1 
FSH  -1  4  10 ER  1  1 INI  4  6  1  7 MEA  -1  7  i NIL  -1  13  1 FOO  -1  2  20  8
BT  1  5  4  3 TZX  18  4  4
PPP6
LUm  -1  -1  61
CRP  -3  4 I  s  10  61
Nfl  I  1  211  10
FMP  1  0 TRN  164
MAC  19 T  T SER  2  ,  2  -
Free  Trade  Area  with  NJAFTA--Low  ELasticities  and  ExistingMVAT  Replacement OUJTPUT  EXPORT  INPORT  NP  ARCG  NP_BRA  INP-USA
WIlT  -7  -17
CR0  -13  -1"  2  NOC  -23iI  -1  WOL  :-  -8  -1 FRs  - 4 FSH  1  3  -1
ENR  -1
MNI  1 
NEA  -3  : NIL  1  - FOO  -2  -1  I-
B  T  1  13  -1 TEX  -3  46  - LUM4  :2  -1
CRP  -4
I S  20  12
N'FM  1  1- FMP  -3  -1  11
TRN  9  10  1 NAC  -5  2
T T  -1  1  1 SrR  4  16
Reduce  External  Tariffs  to  8  Percent  M4utitiateraLtry-Low  Elasticities  and  Existing  VAT  Replacement OUTPUT  EXPORT  IMPORT  INP-ARG  IMP_BRA
NHOC
WOL  -1 
FSH  1
NEA  -1  2
NIL  -3
P00  -1  26
B T  44
TEX  -2  1  3
LUMN  8
CRP  13
NFM  -2  3  6  1  Fl4P  -1  26
TRN  111
MAC  -1
T T  4  4
SER  4  5





MR  M  Mr
R0 R  0  PO  P
Quantity  Imported  from Rest  of World  Quantity  Imported  from Partners
if tariffs are reduced  preferentially  against  partner country inportsyfrom  t to t,  the welfare
change is equal to A + Tp  - TR,  which is positivefor small tariff changes. Further
preferential  tariff reduction obtains  pordons of the triangle C as gains against rectangles
adjacent to TR  as losses Since the height of the rectangles  on the left are unchanged, but
the height of remaining  triangles  on the right shrink, eventuallyfurther  pref erential  tariff
reducdon results in net losses.














Trade Policy Options for Chile: 
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ESTIMATES OF INDIRECT TAX RATES FOR CHILE  
 
Isidro Soloaga 




Introduction and main results 
 
  We estimated effective Value Added Tax (VAT) rates  and effective Other 
Indirect Tax rates for Chile. The principal data source was the Input-Output Tables for 
1986 (IOM) estimated by the Central Bank of Chile, but the value-added base on the IOM 
was rescaled such that the rates were consistent with the aggregate collected net VAT rate 
based on information from the Ministry of Finance
1 . Other indirect taxes, taken from the 
IOM,  include property taxes and license fees, and notably in the cases of tobacco and 
fuels special taxes. Table 1 presents the main results
2. Explanation of the methodology 
employed is provided below. 
 
  To get an approximation of VAT evasion, many authors calculated the potential 
tax base from an Input Output Table and, by  multiplying it by the nominal VAT rate, 
obtained the potential revenues to the government.
3 See, for instance,  Marcel (1987), 
Serra (1991), Silvani and Medina (1989), Silvani and Brondolo (1993), and Aguirre and 
Parthasarathi (1993). Serra and Toro (1994) examined efficiency of tax collection in 
Chile more broadly. Although those studies were not designed to calculate the effective 
VAT rates by sector,  these become by-products of the analysis: to get the effective VAT 
rates one may divide the VAT revenues by sector by the VAT potential base by sector
4. 
 
                                                            
1 Estadisticas de las Finanzas Publicas 1987-1995. Ministerio de Hacienda. Direccion de Presupuestos, p. 
77 
2 The IOM provides data on: taxes on intermediate consumption by origin (domestic or imported inputs); 
indirect taxes that affect goods and services (i.e., Tobacco and  Fuels); indirect taxes that affect activities 
rather than goods and services (e.g., Real State and Licenses taxes);  and information of the Value Added 
Tax (VAT) by  origin (domestic or imported goods and services). 
3 One minus the ratio of effective  to potential VAT revenues gives an estimate of the degree of VAT tax 
evasion. 
4 An additional source of information on effective VAT and output tax rates by sector in Chile is the GTAP 
database (see Gelhar et al. (1996)). We have employed the GTAP database for the input-output tables and 
the trade flows in our model. However, despite discussions with the author of the estimates,  it was not 
possible to reproduce the VAT and domestic output tax rate data of the GTAP database from publicly  
available sources.   A- 4 
  Despite the existence of these high quality studies on the Chilean VAT system, for 
our purposes we found it necessary to perform independent calculations. Our estimates 
share with those previous studies the need to calculate the potential VAT base and to 
have adequate estimates of the VAT collected by sector. But in general, we required 
estimates at a more disaggregated level than was available in these studies, and in some 
cases the data used in the studies were either not documented or were not the most recent 
publicly available. 
 
   For example, the paper by Serra (1991) is one of the best papers to estimate tax 
evasion by sector in Chile.
5 He also used information from the IOM to calculate the 
potential VAT base;  but the VAT payments data by sector are unpublished  data from the 
Central Bank and the Ministry of Finance. Although it is useful to have additional data 
and estimates as a cross-check on estimates based on the known data sources, we 
preferred to employ data that were publicly documented. Moreover, although estimates in 




TABLE A.I. Estimated Value Added and Indirect Output tax rates. 
Sector  VAT rate  Tax on output 
WHT Wheat  17.3%  2.7% 
GRO  Other Grains  17.3%  2.7% 
NGC  Non Grain crops  16.8%  2.8% 
WOL Wool and Other livestock  3.8%  0.6% 
FRS   Forestry  1.9%  1.3% 
FSH   Fishing  6.9%  0.8% 
MIN  Mineral products  0.0%  0.3% 
ENR  Energy  products  14.3%  12.1% 
MEA Meat Products  18.0%  -0.1% 
DAI   Milk Products  18.0%  0.3% 
FOO  Other food products  18.0%  0.1% 
B_T   Beverage and Tobacco  18.0%  27.6% 
TEX  Textiles and apparel and leather product  18.0%  0.5% 
LUM Lumber and wood  18.0%  0.9% 
PPP   Pulp and  Paper  18.0%  0.7% 
CRP  Chemicals rubber and plastics  14.2%  0.5% 
NFM Non ferrous metals  17.7%  0.9% 
I_S     Primary ferrous metals  6.1%  0.8% 
FMP  Fabricated metal products  11.5%  0.2% 
MAC Transport industries  10.3%  0.7% 
TRN  Machinery and equipment  9.8%  -1.3% 
T_T   Trade and transport  2.8%  2.2% 
SER   Services  2.8%  2.2% 
                                                            
5 We thank Pablo Serra for providing the data he employed in his study and for several instructive 
discussions. 
6 The most notable problem sector for our purposes is the manufacturing sector which is disaggregated  in 
his study into Textiles and Other Manufactures.   A- 5 
Sector  VAT rate  Tax on output 
CGD  Savings goods  1.3%  2.2% 




  Data sources and assumptions 
 
  What follows is a description of the assumptions made in the calculations and a  
detailed  list of the sources utilized. A table that shows each of the steps of the   
calculations is  attached as Annex II. 
 
  1. Aggregation: The IOM presents information for  75 goods and activities that 
where aggregated into 24, as our model requires. The mapping from the 75 activities to 
the 24 is detailed in  ANNEX I. 
 
  2. Value added tax: The VAT is a tax on transactions of goods and services. The 
VAT contained in input purchases is denominated “credit” and the VAT charged on sales 
is a “debit”. Firms and individuals affected by the tax pay to the government the 
difference between credit and debit: 
 
   Debit = 0.18*Value of sales 
  -Credit = 0.18*Value of input purchases 
   VAT = 0.18(value of sales-value of inputs purchases). 
 
  That is to say, the VAT is 18% of the value added (sales-inputs). Nonetheless, 
some characteristics differentiate the VAT base in Chile base from the general concept of  
value added : 
 
a) Some sectors are exempt from the tax. These sectors can not take as credit the VAT 
contained in their inputs and their sales do not generate a credit to their buyers. 
b) The VAT contained in purchases of capital goods are considered as credit to the buyer. 
c) Exports generate a rebate of the VAT paid on input purchases. 
 
  Thus, to calculate the VAT base we need to make some adjustments to the 
concept of value added from National Accounts. This has been done in many estimations 
of VAT compliance . We follow here with some modifications the approach presented by  
Marcel (1986). Using information from the IOM for 1977, he calculated the potential 




(1)Gross Value of  Production, at producer price 
                                                            
7  Diez anos del IVA en Chile. M. Marcel, Coleccion Estudios CIEPLAN, # 19, 1986. pp. 83-134. We 
added here between brackets a short explanation of the rationale for adding or subtracting each term.   A- 6 
-(2)Variations in Stocks (part of the increment in stock levels increases VAT credit to the 
firm) 
-(3)Exports (all exports have a rebate of the VAT) 
-(4)Gross value of production of goods and services exempted from the TAX 
=(5)Gross Value of Production affected by the VAT 
 
To this concept of Gross Value of Production affected by the VAT, other adjustments 
follow:  
 
(5)Gross Value of Production affected by the VAT 
-(6)Intermediate Consumption (part of it generates a VAT credit to the firm, the part that 
does not, is added below in 7) 
+(7)Intermediate Consumption exempted from VAT (it  does not generate credit) 
+(8)Investment (Firms can take the VAT paid on investment as a credit) 
-(9)VAT effectively paid to the Government (equal to VAT revenues to the tax collecting 
agency) 
-(10)Other taxes (special VAT on certain goods, etc.)  
=(11a)VAT POTENTIAL BASE (VAT-PB) 
 
  We approximate this value with data from the IOM. Information for items (4) and 
(7) were not available, and we did not include them, assuming implicitly that they cancel 
each other out. We also modified the calculation of the base of the VAT, by including 
imports. In this way, the estimated VAT base by sector could be matched with the VAT 
revenues by sector as it is presented in the IOM tables is 
8: 
 
(1)Gross Value of  Production, at producer price + Imports 
-(2)Variations in Stocks 
-(3)Exports____________________________________ 




-(9)VAT effectively paid to the Government 
-(10)Other taxes_________________________________ 
=(11b)VAT POTENTIAL BASE (VAT_PB) 
 
  The potential base for the VAT was calculated for all sectors and defined as 
VATi_PB.  The effective implicit VAT rate was calculated for all the sectors as:  
  
 VATi rate=VATi revenues/VATi_PB (as in line 11b above); i= sectors 1 to 24.   
  
  Following these calculations, we found that the effective implicit overall VAT 
rate for 1986 resulted equal to 7.9%. The effective rate that prevailed in the most recent 
                                                            
8 A detailed explanation of the sources of each one of the concepts included in our calculations is presented 
in section 4 below.   A- 7 
year for which data is available -1994-  was 9.1% 
9. Since we believe that the calculated 
tax data are more reliable than the estimated VAT base, we proceeded to modify the 
VATi_PB calculated with the original IOM figures by defining VAT1i_PB = 
(7.9/9.1)*VATi_PB, where 7.9 is the effective implicit overall VAT rate for 1986 from 
the IOM and 9.1 is the effective implicit overall VAT rate for 1994. This adjustment 
assures that the overall VAT rate in our data set is consistent with the aggregate 1994 
data, but proportional differences at the sectoral level from the IOM are preserved. 
 
  Despite the fact that there is a maximum legal rate of VAT in Chile of 18 percent 
(20 percent in 1986), based on the data in the IOM there were six sectors among our 24 
with VAT estimated rates above 18%: Slaughter Houses (100%), Dairy (69.5%), Foods 
(195.3%), Beverage and Tobacco (118.7%), Textiles (30.8%) and Paper and Printing 
(35.4%). We regard rates above 18% as implausible and due to imprecise reporting of 
data to the statistical agencies
10.  
 
  Since we consider the calculation of the VAT potential base as the most likely 
source of the inaccurate reporting (as opposed to the data on collected taxes), we 
proceeded to increase the VAT potential base (VATi_PB) of these six sectors by the 
amount necessary to reduce the estimated VAT rate of these sectors to 18 percent
11.  
 
  Additionally, in order to preserve consistency with the overall effective VAT rate, 
it was necessary to keep the aggregate figures of VAT_PB equal to the original of the 
IOM. Thus, we scaled down the VAT_PB of all the other sectors so that the total 
VAT_PB was unchanged. The scaling was done in an proportional manner where the 
weights for the sectors were determined by their share of total VAT_PB. 
  
  Details of the calculations for the 24 sectors are presented in Annex II. 
 
  3. Net indirect tax on final good and services and indirect tax on activities.  
  
  We lumped together the IOM data of taxes affecting specific goods and services 
(Tobacco and Fuels) and taxes affecting activities rather than goods (Real State tax, 
Licenses, etc.).We called this tax Production Tax. The denominator utilized to calculate 
the tax rate was the Gross Value of Domestic Production at  producer prices netted out 
from the taxes that go into the numerator. 
 
  4. Sources and calculations. 
  
  What follows is a description of the information contained in Annex II 
                                                            
9 VAT overall rate=9.1%.: total VAT revenues were 1831.2 millions of Chilean pesos, GDP was 21917.9 
millions of Chilean pesos. Sources: Estadisticas de las Finanzas Publicas 1987-1995. Ministerio de 
Hacienda. Direccion de Presupuestos, p. 77. and Banco Central de Chile, Boletin Mensual # 814, 
Diciembre 1995, p.3390. 
10 It is also possible that VAT data for a sector in the IOM includes payments from other sectors. 
11 The VAT potential base for the Mining sector was originally negative. We limit the lower bound of the 
VAT rate to be equal to zero and consequently the VAT rate for the Mining sector was set equal to zero.   A- 8 
The heading Column # indicates the referenced column in the Annex II, Concept 
indicates the name of the variable and Source identifies what table from the IOM-86 was 
taken following its own nomenclature
12. The last column also describes the calculations 
made in order to get the final results of Table A.I.. 
 
Column #  Concept  Source (Tables of IOM-1986)  Own calculations 
1  Intermediate Consumption  Pre-Otp. pp.286-291,  last row   
2-9  Final transactions  Atp final. p.292.   
10 Imports  Pre-Otp  p.285   
11  Investment in Buildings  Atc-inversion. pp. 364-369, row 51   
12  Gross Value of Production Affected by 
VAT 
 12=9-6-7 
13  Gross Fixed Investment-total  Atc-inversion. pp. 364-375, last row    
14  Activities that generate VAT credit    14=1+13 
15  VAT revenues  Pre-Otp. p.285, column 5   
16  Sector shares in total VAT revenues    16=15/total of 15, in % 
17  Other indirect taxes (on goods-Tobacco 
and Fuels) 
Pre-Otp. p.285, column 4   
18 VAT-Potential  Base    18=12-14-15-17 
18b  VAT_PB adjusted to calibrate to 1994 
VAT revenues. 
  18b=18*(7.9 VAT revenues in 1986, 
as % of GDP)/(9.1 VAT revenues in 
1994, as % of GDP) 
19  VAT_PB after spreading the negative 
value of MIN among all the other sectors 
  19=18b-MIN*18b/(total of column 
18b) 
20  VAT_PB shares of sectors after excluding 
those with VAT rate> 20% in column 21 
and MIN 
  20=19/(total of column 19 after 
excluding seven sectors) 
21  VAT implicit rate    20=15/19 
22  VAT_PB for those sectors with VAT rate 
>20 in column 21 
 22=VAT/0.20 
23  Increments in the base for this sectors 
needed to have them pay 20%. 
 23=22-19 
24  NEW VAT_PB, after subtracting the total 
of column 23 to the rest of the sectors. 
The weight used was column 20. 
  24=19-20*(Total of column 23) 
25  Indirect taxes on Tobacco and Fuels  VA row 6.   
26  Other indirect taxes (on activities rather 
than on goods)  
VA row 7   
27  VAT net rates   27=(15/24) 
28  Y net rates (indirect taxes on gross 




                                                            
12 The IOM information is available to be used in PC. The nomenclature is presented  here only to clearly 
identify the tables used in our calculations.  The description of each table could be found in Chapter 5 of the 
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ANNEX I. Tax rates for Chile 
The 75 activities of the input-output matrix were aggregated into 24 sectors, as they 
appeared in Table I in the text.       




ISIC   Description of the sector 













   
Sector in IOM  1  1110    Agricultural production, 
except fruit 
1.42 2.72  14.04 
Mapped to sector    WHT and GRO 
     
Sector in IOM  2  1120    Fruit production  1.32 2.78  5.51 
Mapped to sector    NGC 
     
Sector in IOM  5  1200    Forestry  1.68 1.28  1.15 
Mapped to sector    FRS 
   
Sector in IOM  6  1300    Fishing  2.67 0.77  5.74 
Mapped to sector    FSH 
   
Sector in IOM  7  2201    Copper 0.05  0.34  0.00 
Sector in IOM  8  2202    Iron 1.91  0.38  0.00 
Sector in IOM  11  2400    Stone, sand & clay  0.57  0.19  12.20 
Sector in IOM  12  2300    Extraction of other 
minerals 
0.78 0.22  0.01 
Mapped to sector    MIN 0.28  0.31  0.22 
   
Sector in IOM  9  2110    Petroleum & natural gas  0.18  1.44  0.00 
Sector in IOM  10  2120    Coal 0.00  1.10  1.60 
Sector in IOM  35  3530    Oil refineries  0.01  16.08  30.68 
Mapped to sector    ENR 0.03  12.14  19.75 
   
Sector in IOM  13  3111    Slaughter houses  0.07 0.00  87.52 
Mapped to sector    MEA 
   
Sector in IOM  14  3112    Dairy products  0.01 0.34  54.68 
Mapped to sector    DAI 
   
Sector in IOM  15  3113    Fruit & vegetable canning  0.05  -2.30  48.95 
Sector in IOM  16  3114    Fish products  0.03  0.07  3.42 
Sector in IOM  17  3115    Manufacture of oil & fat  0.00  0.38  46.84 
Sector in IOM  18  3116    Mill & bakery products  0.01  0.40  55.96 
Sector in IOM  19  3118    Sugar factories & 
refineries 
0.00 0.37  57.39 
Sector in IOM  20  3119    Misc. food products  0.00  0.17  47.03 
Sector in IOM  21  3122    Feeds 0.01  0.22  6.81 
Mapped to sector    FOO 0.02  0.08  34.09 
     
Sector in IOM  22  3133    Soft drinks and beer  0.04  0.59  77.82 
Sector in IOM  23  3131    Alcohol beverages  0.06  0.16  70.66 
Sector in IOM  24  3140    Tobacco industry  0.03  66.10  27.19 
Mapped to sector    B_T 0.05  27.58  41.21 
      
Sector in IOM  25  3210    Textile production  0.04  0.59  27.26 
Sector in IOM  26  3220    Garment production  0.03  0.49  72.81 
Sector in IOM  27  3230    Leather & leather products 0.01  0.55  15.40 
Sector in IOM  28  3240    Shoe industry  0.05  0.52  70.63 
Mapped to sector    TEX 0.04  0.47  44.78 
   
Sector in IOM  29  3310    Wood industry  0.31  0.78  6.24 
Sector in IOM  30  3320    Furniture & fixtures  0.06  1.18  10.60 
Mapped to sector    LUM 0.21  0.92  7.55 
   
Sector in IOM  31  3410    Paper & paper products  0.01  0.55  7.79 
Sector in IOM  32  3420    Printing & publishing  0.27  0.93  31.34 
Mapped to sector    PPP 0.09  0.66  14.39 
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Sector in IOM  33  3510    Industrial chemicals  0.00  0.84  3.35 
Sector in IOM  34  3520    Other chemical products  0.10  0.61  40.49 
Sector in IOM  36  3550    Rubber industry  0.04  0.24  34.45 
Sector in IOM  37  3560    Production of plastic 
products n.e.c. 
0.04 0.36  19.40 
Sector in IOM  38  3610    Stone and clay products  0.00  -0.91  32.37 
Sector in IOM  39  3620    Glass & glass products  0.03  - 18.20 
Mapped to sector    CRP 0.06  0.54  28.07 
   
Sector in IOM  40  3690    Non-metallic mineral 
products n.e.c. 
0.08 0.89  14.73 
Mapped to sector    NFM 
   
Sector in IOM  41  3700    Primary iron and steel 
manufacturing 
0.03 0.79  7.13 
Mapped to sector    I_S 
   
Sector in IOM  42  3810    Fabricated metal products  0.05  0.20  17.94 
Mapped to sector    FMP 
     
Sector in IOM  43  3820    Non-electric machinery 
production 
0.14 0.52  31.89 
Sector in IOM  44  3830    Machinery, equipment & 
electrical accessories 
0.05 0.56  115.40 
Sector in IOM  47  3900    Other manufacturing 
industries 
0.10 2.92  117.10 
Sector in IOM  46  3850    Professional & scientific 
equipment 
0.00 0.07  191.02 
Mapped to sector    MAC 0.08  0.73  79.22 
   
Sector in IOM  45  3840    Transport equipment  0.04 -1.30 34.24 
Mapped to sector    TRN 
   
Sector in IOM  51  5000    Construction 7.53  2.80  0.51 
Sector in IOM  52  6000    Commerce 0.25  2.75  0.09 
Sector in IOM  55  7111    Railroad transportation  6.07  - 0.19 
Sector in IOM  56  7114    Motor freight cargo 
transportation 
7.01 1.63  1.43 
Sector in IOM  57  7112    Passenger road 
transportation 
24.98 1.01  0.00 
Sector in IOM  58  7120    Water transportation  0.00  0.60  0.07 
Sector in IOM  59  7130    Air transportation  2.06  0.97  0.70 
Sector in IOM  60  7190    Transport related services 0.30  1.14  1.86 
Sector in IOM  61  7200    Communications 0.00  0.68  13.06 
Mapped to sector    T_T 5.19  2.16  0.91 
   
Sector in IOM  48  4101    Electric power  0.07  0.41  9.63 
Sector in IOM  49  4102    Gas production & 
distribution 
10.88 0.63  41.71 
Sector in IOM  50  4200    Hydraulic works  & water 
supply 
0.40 - 28.73 
Sector in IOM  53  6310    Restaurants 2.95  - 50.70 
Sector in IOM  54  6320    Hotels 1.54  1.84  20.35 
   
Sector in IOM  63  8200    Insurance 0.91  1.07  8.29 
Sector in IOM  64  8310    Property rental  4.01  3.35  0.32 
Sector in IOM  65  8320    Business services  2.99  1.44  2.84 
Sector in IOM  66  8900    Real estate  0.84  7.76  0.00 
Sector in IOM  67  9311    Public education  15.20  0.95  0.00 
Sector in IOM  68  9312    Private education  10.25  1.38  0.00 
Sector in IOM  69  9331    Public health  18.81  0.62  0.06 
Sector in IOM  70  9332    Private health  12.63  0.80  1.53 
Sector in IOM  71  9410    Motion pictures, TV, radio 
& shows 
0.40 3.05  18.60 
Sector in IOM  72  9490    Other recreation services  8.99  13.92  6.39   A - 10 
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Sector in IOM  73  9510    Repair services  0.82  1.86  16.34 
Sector in IOM  74  9600    Miscellaneous services  5.39  1.95  8.70 
Sector in IOM  75  9100    Public Administration & 
Defense 
12.35 0.44  0.00 
Mapped to sector    SER 6.17  2.23  3.08 
   
Sector in IOM  62  8100    Financial institutions  10.14  2.00  0.97 
Mapped to sector    CGD 
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ANNEX II. Tax Rates for Chile 
Data and Calculations 
 
Sector  Intermediate   Final Consumption    Import  K buildings  VBP 
Domestic 
Gross Fixed 
  Consumption  Hhold  NGO  Govern-
ment 
K fijo  Stocks  Exports  Total  Total use  supply, pp  ATC 
inversion 
Affected  Investment 
  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12=9-6-7  13 
                           
WHT  90005  52671  0  0  2522  1539  10447  67179  199467  13571  3502  187481  12098 
GRO  90005  52671  0  0  2522  1539  10447  67179  199467  13571  3502  187481  12098 
NGC  33625  22628  0  0  12939  327  60397  96291  113905  2546  2687  53181  19286 
WOL  67655  17536  0  0  1910  -1270  4966  23142  140022  618  2653  136326  9242 
FRS  4560  595  0  0  2572  -223  7706  10650  22594  128  0  15111  5365 
FSH  37364  7550  0  0  0  111  1937  9598  67410  96  0  65362  13448 
MIN  272186  6  0  0  0  5421  452396  457823  569091  8683  37794  111274  89785 
ENR  183269  85298  0  0  8312  -4880  3477  92207  444172  127278  9921  445575  25354 
MEA  101073  114477  0  0  0  242  2902  117621  146471  1309  255  143327  1239 
DAI  40582  48701  0  0  0  343  682  49726  62208  2165  133  61183  2492 
FOO  309603  223359  0  0  0  16422  113309  353090  479063  22146  5187  349332  17647 
B_T  53950  102683  0  0  0  2034  4821  109538  124710  3983  745  117855  2359 
TEX  149348  174189  0  0  2528  12728  1970  191415  296338  54947  1335  281640  13626 
LUM  46450  17473  0  0  7182  3253  18842  46750  90003  906  329  67908  3909 
PP  97608  32283  0  0  0  -529  52421  84175  176132  20308  2752  124240  10387 
CRP  146101  91098  0  0  124  9457  10045  110724  408030  160521  2812  388528  8930 
NFM  21826  597  0  0  0  1159  136  1892  48487  4387  698  47192  2085 
I_S  49957  0  0  0  668  1102  12028  13798  114541  32648  98  101411  3465 
FMP  54139  7018  0  0  20290  4062  3295  34665  120232  36875  641  112875  1704 
MAC  40262  54810  0  0  139162  5547  2859  202378  324069  254913  218  315663  5362 
TRN  25791  19556  0  0  43358  2112  4665  69691  119710  74124  422  112933  1194 
T_T  771658  527569  0  0  353277  813  170288  1051947  1736000  83485  20722  1564899  69181 
SER  687280  597038  16858  430697  95  0  47822  1092510  1534930  129746  222324  1487108  262355 
CGD  37296  21174  0  0  0  0  1272  22446  293249  3378  1378  291977  5520 
TOTAL  3374297  2249806  16858  430697  6E+05  61309  1E+06  4E+06  8E+06  1E+06  318730  6477885  592611 
Sources:  I-O Tables-1986. Banco Central Chile. 
1. Pre-Otp. pp. 286-291, last row. 
7. Pre-Otp. p. 292, column 7th. 
9. Pre-Otp. p. 292, column 9th. 
11. Atcinversion, pp. 364-369, row 51th. 
13. Atcinversion, pp 364-369, last row. 
15. Pre-Otp. p. 285, column 5th. 
17. Pre-Otp. p. 285, column 4th.   A - 12 
 


























  14=1+13  15  16  17  18=12-14-15-
17 
by 7.9/9.1  19=18b+  20  21=15/19  22=VAT/0.18  23=22-19 
Sector      Shares      18b=18*7.9.9
.1 
share*MIN  Shares       
WHT  77907  11835  7.55%  0  97739  84421  82767  2.84%  14.0%     
GRO  77907  11835  7.55%  0  97739  84421  82767  2.84%  14.0%     
NGC  14339  4098  2.61%  0  34744  30010  29422  1.01%  13.7%     
WOL  58413  2015  1.29%  0  75898  65556  64272  2.20%  3.1%     
FRS  -805  204  0.13%  0  15712  13571  13305  0.46%  1.5%     
FSH  23916  1919  1.22%  0  39527  34141  33472  1.15%  5.6%     
MIN  182401  634  0.00%  0  -71761  -61983  0  0.00%  0.0%      
ENR  157915  22916  14.62%  35808  228936  197740  193868  6.65%  11.6%     
MEA  99834  20203  0.00%  0  23290  20116  19722  0.00%  100.4%  112239  92516 
DAI  38090  8665  0.00%  0  14428  12462  12218  0.00%  69.5%  48139  35921 
FOO  291956  36019  0.00%  0  21357  18447  18086  0.00%  195.3%  200106  182020 
B_T  51591  19511  0.00%  27729  19024  16432  16110  0.00%  118.7%  108394  92285 
TEX  135722  30694  0.00%  0  115224  99523  97574  0.00%  30.8%  170522  72948 
LUM  42541  2936  1.87%  0  22431  20024  19632  0.67%  14.7%      
PP  87221  8664  0.00%  0  28355  24491  24012  0.00%  35.4%  48133  24122 
CRP  137171  22803  14.54%  0  228554  197410  193544  6.64%  11.6%     
NFM  19741  3027  1.93%  0  24424  21096  20683  0.71%  14.3%     
I_S  46492  2267  1.45%  0  52652  45477  44587  1.53%  5.0%     
FMP  52435  4527  2.89%  0  55913  48294  47348  1.62%  9.4%     
MAC  34900  18958  12.09%  0  261805  226130  221702  7.60%  8.4%     
TRN  24597  5699  3.64%  0  82637  71377  69979  2.40%  8.0%     
T_T  702477  16857  10.75%  0  845565  730345  716042  24.56%  2.3%     
SER  424925  24880  15.87%  0  1278308  1104121  1082498  37.12%  2.3%     
CGD  31776  2417  1.54%  0  257784  222657  218297  7.49%  1.1%     
TOTAL  2781686  3E+05  2E+05  ####  3592501  3102973  3103610.662  2915889.1  9.1%  687533  499812 
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  New Base  New share  Indirect taxes  Other indirect  VAT  TY 
      (Tobacco and  taxes   net rates  Indirect taxes/ 
  24=19    Fuels)    27=15/24  on gross production 
Sector  share*Tot23    25  26    29=(25+26)/(9-25-26) 
WHT  68580    0  4745  17.3%  2.7% 
GRO  68580    0  4745  17.3%  2.7% 
NGC  24379    0  3019  16.8%  2.8% 
WOL  53255    0  884  3.8%  0.6% 
FRS  11025    0  283  1.9%  1.3% 
FSH  27735    0  597  6.9%  0.8% 
MIN  0    0  1726  0.0%  0.3% 
ENR  160637    35808  962  14.3%  12.1% 
MEA  112239    0  -89  18.0%  -0.1% 
DAI  48139    0  170  18.0%  0.3% 
FOO  200106    0  207  18.0%  0.1% 
B_T  108394    27729  350  18.0%  27.6% 
TEX  170522    0  1021  18.0%  0.5% 
LUM  16267    0  792  18.0%  0.9% 
PP  48133    0  1063  18.0%  0.7% 
CRP  160369    0  385  14.2%  0.5% 
NFM  17138    0  393  17.7%  0.9% 
I_S  36944    0  421  6.1%  0.8% 
FMP  39232    0  143  11.5%  0.2% 
MAC  183700    0  318  10.3%  0.7% 
TRN  57984    0  -647  9.8%  -1.3% 
T_T  593305    0  35044  2.8%  2.2% 
SER  896947    0  37826  2.8%  2.2% 
CGD  180879    0  5719  1.3%  2.2% 
TOTAL 3103611    63537  89613  9.1%  2.4% 
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Appendix B 
 
Overview of Tariff Calculations for the Quantitative Analysis  
of Chile’s Trade Policy Options 
 
Ulrich Reincke 





This document provides an overview over the tariff aggregation for the project evaluation Chile’s trade policy 
options. Section 1 presents the data source, section 2 discusses the data aggregation method and section 3 lists the 
Mercosur tariff matrices. 
 
1. Data and Data Sources: 
 
The computations are based on trade and tariff data from the Trade Analysis and Information Database (TRAINS 2.0 
A) from February 1996.  This data has been assembled and stored on CD-ROM by the United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). TRAINS data for Argentina, Brazil, and Chile were used. The trade data 
are from the year 1994 and tariff data are from 1995. For the other countries in the project, the GTAP database was 
employed for the tariff data.  
 
2. Calculation of the Tariff Matrices 
 
  For each import market a tariff matrix was generated, that lists the trade weighted average tariff rates faced 
by the 30 supplying regions (columns) in the 32 product categories (rows). Let the index i run over the 32 product 
categories (i.e. grains, non-grain crops, wool...) and let the index j run over the 20 supplying regions (i.e. Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan ...).  The entries of each tariff matrix 






















where  ik T is the tariff rate in tariff line ik ,  i
e
k w is the value of trade imports originating in exporter e,EXPG j is 
the exporter group j, and  PRODi  is the product group i. The detailed exporter and product groups are listed in 
Table 1. and Table 2. Please notice that the first summation in the numerator and denominator is necessary since  
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some regions for example Sub-Saharan Africa or Eastern Europe are aggregates of several exporter countries. 
Needless to say that for regions of one country, (for example Japan) the first summation is not necessary. 
 
To get a better grasp of the structure of the tariff matrices let us  look next at Argentina’s tariff matrix for the most 
favored nation tariff rates (arg_mfn.txt). In column 1, row 4 we find  the coefficientt
14 02
, . =  which is the trade 
weighted average MFN tariff rate for  Australia‘s “non grain crops” exports as they enter Argentina. In column 2 row 
4 in contrast we find  the coefficient t24 87 , . =  which is the trade weighted average MFN tariff rate for  New 
Zealand‘s “non grain crops” exports as they enter Argentina.  
  
  The two exporter countries face different weighted average tariff rates, since they ship  different bundles of 
goods in the category “non grain crops” to Argentina. On average Australia exports more low tariff products, than  
New Zealand. As an illustration a hypothetical example for the product category “non grain crops” will be provided:  
 
  Let us assume New Zealand exports $1mill of potatos and $2mill of 
mushrooms to Argentina, while Australia exports $ 2 mill of potatoes and $ 1 
mill of mushrooms to Argentina. Potatoes and mushrooms are presumed to be 
the only “non grain crop” products that both countries export to Argentina. 
Furthermore let Argentina have an ad valorem tariff rate of 2% in potatoes and 
10% on mushrooms. Then Argentina’s weighted average tariff rate on New 
Zealand’s “non grain crop” exports is 
 
t14








 $ mill  $ mill
 $ mill  $ mill
 , 
 
and on Australia’s “non grain crop” exports is 
 
t24








 $ mill  $ mill
 $ mill  $ mill
 . 
 
Hence although Argentina’s MFN tariff schedule does not discriminate against 
products that originate in different countries,  the actual tariff incidence falls 
heavier those countries, that export relatively more high tariff products.  
 
  In some export regions there was no trade in certain product categories and consequently a weighted 
average tariff could not be calculated. A tariff rate of -1 marks missing tariff averages. However, missing tariff 
averages were substituted by the average tariff of imports from the world as a whole. So one will either find an entire 
row of -1 or no -1 at all. This procedure was followed when in the construction of the original GTAP version 2 and 
version 3 matrices. 
 
  The matrices show in their header the acronym of the importing market and the type of tariff rate used for 
the calculation: 
 
•  ARG:= Argentina,  
•  BRA:= Brazil, 
•  CHL:= Chile, 
•  MFN:= Applied Most Favored Nation Tariff,  
•  CET:= Mercosur Common External Tariff.  
 
The above procedure was applied to calculate the following tariff matrices: 
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•  arg_mfn.txt (Argentina, Applied Most Favored Nation Tariff) 
•  arg_cet.txt (Argentina, Mercosur Common External Tariff) 
•  bra_mfn.txt (Brazil, Applied Most Favored Nation Tariff) 
•  bra_cet.txt (Brazil, Mercosur Common External Tariff) 
•  chl_mfn.txt (Chile, Applied Most Favored Nation Tariff) 
 
  Each tariff matrix lists in the rows the products and in the columns the exporting markets. The columns and 
row order follow the region and product numbering of table B.1 and B.2. The five tariff matrices are listed in section 
3. 
 
  The detailed GTAP regions and sectors are mapped into our 24-sector aggregation in the obvious way.  The 
aggregate EU in our model includes the E_U in the original GTAP model and the EU3 of the original GTAP model.  
All other regions are aggregated into our Residual ROW region.  With respect to sector aggregation, PDR and GRO 
are aggregated into GRO, WOL and OLP into WOL; COL, OIL, GAS and P_C into ENR; OMN and NMM into 
MIN; OFP and PCR into FOO; TEX, WAP and LEA into TEX; OME and OMF into MAC; and EGW, CNS, OSP, 
OSG and DWE into SER. 
 
  We then calculate average MFN tariffs for each of CHL, ARG and BRA with respect to all other regions.  
In other words, these averages are unweighted with respect to base level trade flows between CHL, ARG and BRA 
and the other regions.  However, we do keep distinct the tariffs that each apply against all other regions.  We do 
likewise for the CET tariffs imposed by ARG and BRA. 
 
  In the initial benchmark equilibrium each of CHL, ARG and BRA are assumed to have the MFN tariffs 
calculated as described above.  We then simulate the completion of MERCOSUR by assuming that ARG and BRA 
adopt the CET tariffs calculated as above.  The solution to this simulation is then adopted as our “reference 
equilibrium” for all further simulations. 
 
  Our base model uses the MFN tariffs for Chile, and a simple average of the CET of ARG and BRA as the 
CET used by Chile when it forms a full customs union with MERCOSUR in simulation CHL_M. 
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Table B.1. Export Market Aggregation: Version 3 of the GTAP Data Base 
 
1    AUS  Australia  
2    NZL  New Zealand 
3    JPN  Japan 
4    KOR  Korea 
5    IDN  Indonesia  
6    MYS  Malaysia 
7    PHL  Philippines 
8    SGP  Singapore 
9    THA  Thailand 
10   CHN  China 
11   HKG  Hong Kong 
12   TWN  Taiwan 
13   IDI  India  
14   RAS  Rest of South Asia (composite region) (includes: 
               Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, 
               Pakistan, Sri Lanka) 
15   CAN  Canada 
16   USA  United States  
17   MEX  Mexico 
18   CAM  Central America and the Carribean (composite 
               region) (includes: Antigua & Barbuda, 
               Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Costa Rica, Cuba, 
               Dominica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
               Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, 
               Nicaragua, Panama, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. 
               Lucia, St. Vincent, Trinidad & Tobago)  
19   ARG  Argentina 
20   BRA  Brazil  
21   CHL  Chile  
22   RSM  Rest of South America (composite region) 
               (includes: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
               Guyana, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, 
               Venezuela) 
23   E_U  European Union 12  
               (includes: Belgium, 
               Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, 
               Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, 
               Spain, United Kingdom) 
24   EU3  Austria, Finland, and Sweden 
25   EFT  EFTA (composite region) (includes Iceland, Norway, 
               Switzerland)  
26   CEA  Central European Associates (composite region) 
               (includes: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary 
               Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
27   FSU  Former Soviet Union (includes: Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
               Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
               Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russian 
               Federation, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan 
               Ukraine, Uzbekistan) 
28   MEA  Middle East and North Africa (composite region) 
               (includes: Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iran, 
               Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, 
               Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syrian 
               Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, 
               Yemen Arab Republic)  
29   SSA  Sub Saharan Africa (composite region) (includes: 
               Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, 
               Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central 
               African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, 
               Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, 
               Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, 
               Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, 
               Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, 
               Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
               Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, 
               Senegal, Seychelles Islands, Sierra Leone, 
               Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, 
               Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia,  
               Zimbabwe)  
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30 ROW Rest of World (composite region) (includes: 
               Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Bosnia- 
               Herzegovina, Brunei,  Cambodia, Croatia, 
               Cyprus, Fiji, Kiribati, Laos, Leichtenstein, 
               Macedonia [former Yugoslav Republic of], 
               Malta, Monaco, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nauru, 
               North Korea, Papua New Guinea, San Marino, 
               Solomon Islands, Tonga, Turkey, Tuvalu, 
               Vanuatu, Viet Nam, Western Samoa, Yugoslavia 
               [Serbia and Montenegro]) 
 
 
Table B.2. GTAP Product Categories: Version 3 of the Data Base 
 
1  pdr, paddy rice                      
2  wht, wheat                           
3  gro, grains                          
4  ngc, non grain crops                   
5  wol, wool                            
6  olp, other livestock                 
7  for, forestry                        
8  fsh, fisheries                       
9  col, coal                            
10 oil, oil                             
11 gas, gas                             
12 omn, other minerals                  
13 pcr, processed rice                  
14 met, meat products                   
15 mil, milk products                   
16 ofp, other food products             
17 b_t, beverages and tobacco           
18 tex, textiles                        
19 wap, wearing apparels                
20 lea, leather etc                     
21 lum, lumber                          
22 ppp, pulp paper etc                  
23 p_c, petroleum and coal              
24 crp, chemicals rubbers and plastics  
25 nmm, nonmetallic minerals            
26 i_s, primary ferrous metals          
27 nfm, nonferrous metals               
28 fmp, fabricated metal products       
29 trn, transport industries            
30 ome, machinery and equipment         
31 omf, other manufacturing   
32 egw, electricity water and gas        
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32 30 ROW_ORDER header ", ARG_MFN 
    6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   7.1   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7 
    5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0 
    0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.2   0.0   7.5   0.0   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.0   0.0   0.4 
    0.2   8.7   0.5   8.0   4.4   4.0   4.0   4.6   3.7   6.9   7.9   1.7   6.7   7.6   2.3   3.6   6.2   9.9   8.8   9.9   8.2   9.6   6.3   8.0   8.0   8.0   6.0   7.5   5.2   9.7 
    8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0 
    2.1   4.0   2.3   2.3   2.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   8.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   0.5   1.3   2.3   2.8   2.3   1.2   2.5   3.1   1.8   2.3   6.8   2.3   2.3   2.0   6.7   2.3 
    2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0 
   10.0   8.6   8.6  10.0  10.0  10.0   8.0   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6  10.0   8.6   6.1   8.6   8.6   8.6   9.3  10.0   9.5   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6  10.0   8.6   8.6 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    2.8   4.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.5   2.3  10.0   2.3   2.3   1.2   3.3   4.0   4.2   2.3   2.1   2.2   2.9   4.5   3.5   5.3   2.3   4.0   2.3   3.1   2.3 
   11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0 
   10.5  16.0  16.0  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.0  10.3  10.5  10.5  12.5  10.7   9.9  10.5  10.6   9.9  10.5  10.0  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5 
   15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4 
   15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2 
   17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9  17.9 
   17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5  17.5 
   21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5  21.5 
   24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9  24.9 
   13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5  13.5 
   15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3  15.3 
    0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7 
   10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3  10.3 
   12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7  12.7 
   15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2  15.2 
    9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0 
   16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8 
   16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9  16.9 
    9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3   9.3 
   18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9  18.9 






32 30 ROW_ORDER header ", ARG_CET 
    6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   7.1   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7   6.7 
    5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0 
    0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.2   0.0   7.5   0.0   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.4   0.0   0.0   0.4 
    0.2   8.7   0.5   8.0   4.4   4.0   4.0   4.6   3.7   6.9   7.9   1.7   6.7   7.6   2.3   3.6   6.2   9.9   8.8   9.9   8.2   9.6   6.3   8.0   8.0   8.0   6.0   7.5   5.2   9.7 
    8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0 
    2.1   4.0   2.3   2.3   2.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   8.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   0.5   1.3   2.3   2.8   2.3   1.2   2.5   3.1   1.8   2.3   6.8   2.3   2.3   2.0   6.7   2.3 
    2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0 
   10.0   8.6   8.6  10.0  10.0  10.0   8.0   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6  10.0   8.6   6.1   8.6   8.6   8.6   9.3  10.0   9.5   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6   8.6  10.0   8.6   8.6 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    2.8   4.0   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.3   2.5   2.3  10.0   2.3   2.3   1.2   3.3   4.0   4.2   2.3   2.1   2.2   2.9   4.5   3.5   5.3   2.3   4.0   2.3   3.1   2.3 
   11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0 
   10.5  16.0  16.0  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.0  10.3  10.5  10.5  12.5  10.7   9.9  10.5  10.6   9.9  10.5  10.0  10.5  10.5  10.5  10.5 
   15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4  15.4 
   15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0  15.0 
   19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1  19.1 
   17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7 
   19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6  19.6 
   19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4  19.4 
   11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8  11.8 
   10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4  10.4 
    0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7   0.7 
   10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6  10.6 
   12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6 
   11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4  11.4 
    7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7   7.7 
   16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5  16.5 
   17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1 
   12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9  12.9 
   18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0  18.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
  
 B-7 
32 30 ROW_ORDER header ", bra_MFN 
    7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9 
    5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0 
    7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4   7.4 
    4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4   4.4 
    8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0 
    2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4   2.4 
    2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1 
    9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5   8.5 
   10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1  10.1 
    2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0 
   11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0 
   10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7 
   22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9  22.9 
   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2 
   12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6  12.6 
   16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2 
   19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5 
   11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3  11.3 
   11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1  11.1 
    7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8   7.8 
   13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1  13.1 
    8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2   8.2 
   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2 
   12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2 
    6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8   6.8 
   16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2 
   17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7 
   15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6  15.6 
   17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7 






32 30 ROW_ORDER header ", bra_CET 
    7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9   7.9 
    5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0   5.0 
    7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6   7.6 
    6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2   6.2 
    8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0   8.0 
    2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5   2.5 
    2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1   2.1 
    9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9   9.9 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0 
    2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0   2.0 
   11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0 
   10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7 
   15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9  15.9 
   10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2  10.2 
   17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1 
   16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8  16.8 
   19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5  19.5 
   11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5  11.5 
   11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7  11.7 
    8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1   8.1 
    0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5   0.5 
    9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0   9.0 
   10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7  10.7 
   12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2  12.2 
    6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9   6.9 
   16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2  16.2 
   17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1  17.1 
   12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1  12.1 
   17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7  17.7 
    0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   0.0  
 B-8 
 
32 30 ROW_ORDER header ", chl_CET 
   11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0  11.0 
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APPENDIX C  
 




The Optimal Markup as a Function of the Elasticity 
 
  In our multisector, multiregion model, Chile will face an elasticity of demand for 
its exports that will vary with the sector and the region to which it exports. Suppose for 
any sector i, Chile faces an elasticity of demand  ∈ ir for its exports to region R that is less 
than infinite. As long as this elasticity is less than infinite, Chile will possess some 
monopoly power on its exports. This monopoly power will be very small for high 
elasticities, but it will give rise to a positive optimal export tax. 
 
  Given a less than infinite  ∈ ir Chile will maximize the profits from its exports of 
products in sector i to region R by setting marginal revenue equal to marginal costs. Then 
Chile must charge the price Pir, where   
 
  [] PM C ir ir i 11 −∈= (/ ) . .        ( 1 )  
 
We have defined the elasticity to be positive in (1) and assume that  ∈ ir is greater than 
one. As long as the elasticity is less than infinite, the optimum price exceeds marginal 
costs. Individual competitive firms will price according to marginal costs, so there is an 
optimal export tax to charge competitive firms so that they demand Pir  for their products. 
Inverting (1) to solve for the optimal export tax tir
* , we have: 
 
  [] PM C M C t ir i ir i ir =− ∈ = + ..
* /( / ) ( ) 11 1       ( 2 )  
 
which implies that the optimal export tax is: 
 
  [] tir ir ir
* /( ) . =∈ ∈− − 11          ( 3 )  
 
where again  ∈ ir is the elasticity of demand for Chilean exports from sector i in region R.  
The optimal export tariff varies inversely with the elasticity, but even for fairly high 
values like 21, the optimal export tax in a sector would be 5%.  
 
  From Lerner symmetry effects, Chile can exploit its monopoly power by 
employing an import tariff. If there were only one import and export good and only one 
export region, the import tariff could substitute perfectly for the export tax. But the 
import tariff will impose a more or less uniform export tax. Thus,  it will not be a perfect  
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substitute for export taxes, because the import tariff will impose taxes on exports that will 
not vary across sectors and export markets with the elasticities of demand. Nonetheless,  
without export taxes, it will be optimal to have an import tariff approximately given by a 
weighted average of the optimal export taxes across sectors and regions.  It remains to 
calculate this elasticity ∈ ir in our model.  
 
 
The Utility Function Structure 
 
  In order to calculate the elasticity of demand ∈ ir, it is necessary to derive the 
demand functions for Chilean exports in each of the products and export regions for Chile 
in our model. For each region r in our model, there is a representative consumer with a 
weakly separable utility function: 
 
 U r = Ur (A1r,...,A24)     r  =  1,...,11    (4) 
 
where the goods Air i = 1,...,24 in our model, represent “Armington” aggregate goods . In 
general, we take this “top level” utility function to be of the Cobb-Douglas type, which 
implies that expenditure shares on each aggregate good are unchanged by changes in 
prices.  For the purpose of this calculation, we assume that the demand for the 
Armingtom aggregate arising from other sources (intermediate demand, government and 
investment demand) has the same structure. 
 
  In order to improve the clarity, in what follows we suppress both sector and 
regional subscripts except where additional subscripts are required. The representative 
consumer in each region regards each Armington aggregate good Air as a CES aggregate 
of imports and domestically produced goods: 
 
  [] AA M D =+ − φφ
ρρ ρ () 1
1







DM   (5) 
 
where    σ DM   is the elasticity of substitution between aggregate imports and domestic 
production discussed in the text. 
 
  Similarly, the representative consumer in region r  regards imports as an aggregate 
of imports from all the other 10 regions in the model: 
 






















,    (6) 
 
where   Mr´r   =   exports from region r´ to region r in sector i. 
 
and σ mm is the elasticity of substitution between imports from different sources discussed 
in the text.   
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  Since we are searching for the demand for Chilean exports, before deriving the 
demand functions, it is convenient to rewrite the subutility function for aggregate imports 
in the following equivalent form: 
 
  [] CC C R
MM M =+ − λλ
ρρ ρ () 1
1
       ( 7 )  





























        ( 8 )  
 
  Equation (6) is equivalent to the last two equations because we have the same 
elasticity of substitution in all equations. 
 
 
The Demand Functions 
 
  Since this “nested” structure of utility functions implies that the utility functions 
are weakly separable, and the subutility functions are homothetic, the conditions which 
permit us to perform multi-stage budgeting are satisfied.  Maximizing (5) subject to 
income allocation to the Armington aggregate yields the demand in region r for aggregate 















1         ( 9 )  
 
Similarly, maximizing (7) subject to the income allocated to aggregate imports, yields 
















1         ( 1 0 )  
 
 
and where PA is the dual price of the Armington aggregate A, i.e., the price of a unit of 
utility of the Armingtom aggregate when purchased at minimum cost given prices PD and 





PA A PM PD
PM C PC PR





















      
 
 
and PC is the price of Chilean imports of sector i in region r. 
 
  Substituting for aggregate imports into the demand for Chilean products and 


















        ( 1 3 )  
 
where   KA C mm mm =
−− σσ σ σ φλ




The Elasticity of Demand 
 
 
  To obtain the elasticity of demand rewrite C from (13) as 
 
  [] C H PC PM PA A =ℜ ,, , ;        ( 1 4 )  
 
 where  ℜ are the parameters of (13).  Totally differentiating and using the chain 

































































































































− 1  
 








=           ( 1 6 )  
 














Substitute in these partial derivatives into (15) and multiply both sides by 
PC
C
 to obtain 



















































  First note that the term in brackets on the right side of (17) is multiplied by 
λ
σ mm where λ  is approximated by Chile’s share of the import market of sector i in region r.  
(17)  
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Since this is likely to be small, the second term will be small relative to σ mm .  Thus, the 
first term on the right σ mm  dominates the elasticity.  Secondly, since σσ mm > and  σ >1, 
the second term on the right is positive.  Thus, ∈− < σ mm 0, and the elasticity of demand 
for Chile’s exports of sector i goods in region r will be less than σ mm .  Since it follows 
from (3) that the optimal tariff increases as the elasticity decreases,  if Chile’s market 
share is significant in some region for some product, the elasticity of demand is smaller 
and Chile’s optimal export tax is higher. 
 
 
The Optimal Tariff in Our Model 
 
  In our high elasticity scenarios, we have chosen σ mm  = 30 for all regions and 
products; and in the low elasticity scenarios, we have σ mm  = 8. Thus, when the Chilean 
share of the import market is small, from equation (3), the optimal tariff on Chilean 
exports of product i to regions r will be about 3.5% in the high elasticity case and about 
14.2% in the low elasticity case. But, with either high or low elasticities, it will increase 
in those export markets where the Chilean share is significant.  
  
 